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1I. Introduction
In ancient China, women were advised to swallow twenty| four live tad-
poles in the spring to prevent conception for the following ve years.' In the
Talmud, written around 200 A.D., the Hebrews described the use of spongy
substances used by women trying to prevent sperm from entering the womb.2
Centuries later in the mid|1700s, Italian adventurer Giovanni Casanova advo-
cated women's use of half a lemon from which the juice had been extracted, as
a cervical cap to be worn during intercourse to hinder conception.3
These historical examples demonstrate that methods of contraception have
been discussed for ages. Yet, despite its long history, contraceptive science has
hardly advanced beyond these primitive practices. The synthesis of the rst
oral contraceptive (the Pill) in 1951, and its subsequent distribution in 1960, is
clearly the most remarkable breakthrough in recent times. Unfortunately, this
achievement is notable also for its singularity. Only limited progress has been
made in contraceptive development in the thirty-ve years since the Pill became
available. The slow pace of development has been particularly problematic in
the United States, leaving Americans with few contraceptive alternatives.
1Backgrounder: Oral Contraceptives (Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., Raritan,
N.J.), Oct. 14, 1992, at 1.
2Robin Berman, Whatever Happened to the Contraceptive Revolution, WASH.
POST, Dec. 14, 1994 (Health), at 12, 15.
31d.
1
2This paper will discuss why this lack of contraceptive alternatives poses such
a tremendous problem, and will describe the birth control options currently
available. Additionally, the paper will describe the four main reasons for the
lack of progress in contraceptive development: a deluge of product liability suits;
negative political pressures; the large expense of testing products intended for
a healthy population; and insucient research and funding. Finally, the paper
will oer some proposals for addressing each of these problems.
II. The Need for More Contraceptives
In February 1990, the National Research Council's Committee on Contra-
ceptive Development (NRCCCD) released a report based on its two-year study
of the development and approval process for contraceptives in the United States.
The committee concluded that current contraceptive choices were inadequate.
Furthermore, they found that because decisions about contraception aect the
vast majority of people in the U.S., developing additional methods that are safe,
eective and acceptable within the cultural, social, religious, and ethical frame-
works ... of society would have a signicant positive eect on human well-being.4
The societal ramications of having only a limited number of contraceptive
options is clearly demonstrated
4Luigi Mastrojanni, Jr. et al., Special Report: Development of
Contraceptives { Obstacles and Opportunities, 322 NEW E1~. J. MED. 482
(1990).
2
3through recent public health statistics. According to data compiled by The Washington Post,
fty-seven percent (3.6 million) of all pregnancies in the United States each year
are unplanned.5 Moreover, American teens have higher pregnancy rates than
their counterparts in other Western countries despite equivalent rates of sex-
ual activity.6 The problem of unplanned pregnancy is not limited to teenagers
{indeed, eighty percent of unplanned pregnancies in this country are to women
twenty years or older.7 Almost half of these unplanned pregnancies end in abor-
tion, the rest result in births. As a result, about thirty percent of all pregnancies
in the U.S. end in abortion, a rate higher than any other industrialized nation.8
Moreover, because of the dearth of options available, the draconian choice of
irreversible female sterilization, i.e., the clamping or cauterization of the Fallop-
ian tubes, is the second most popular form of birth control for American women,
after oral contraceptives. Twelve percent of married women under thirty years
of age have had this operation.9
5Berman, supra note 2, at 12. Although the enormous social costs of these
unplanned pregnancies in terms of health care, missed educational and work
opportunities for the parents and children, and the burdens on the American
welfare system are certainly troubling, an analysis of these issues is beyond the
scope of this paper.
6Kim Painter, The Imperfect State of Birth Control in the USA, USA TonAz,
Mar. 16, 1992, at 4D.
7Berman, supra note 2, at 12. Still, American teenage pregnancy rates
are high: 21% of teens ages 15|19 who have had sexual intercourse became
pregnant last year, i.e., 12% of all women in this age group. Id. 81d. The
abortion rate in Great Britain is 16% of all pregnancies; in Canada, the rate is
17%. Id.
91d.
3
4In light of these statistics, the demand for contraceptives seems indisputable.
Nevertheless, pharmaceutical companies are not acting to meet that demand.
Only thirty years ago, thirteen American companies were researching contra-
ceptives, including some large pharmaceutical companies like Upjohn, Syntex,
and G.D. Searle.'0 In addition, as recently as 1978, Advertising Acre was con-
templating Proctor & Gamble's entry into the huge business [of contraception]
... that appears ripe for change. However, today only Ortho Pharmaceutical
Corp., a division of Johnson & Johnson, does signicant in|house research in
this eld. Although Wyeth|Ayerst, another large rm, distributes Norplant,
the research on Norplant was performed by the Population Council, a non-prot
research foundation founded by John D. Rockefeller, and the rm will share its
prots with the Council. According to the Council, its own modest size slowed
the pace of the project, and development of Norplant took four times as long as
it would have at a large pharmaceutical company.'2 Indeed, Dr.
C. Wayne Bardin of the Population Council, asserts that developing
contraceptives this way, is good only if you are opposed to contraception .... It
takes us a very long time to bring a contraceptive to market.'3
~0Id. at 13.
Larry Edwards, P & G's Contraceptive Work Could Shake Up Market,
ADVERTISING A~, Oct. 30, 1978, at 6.
'2Herman, supra note 2, at 14.
13Philip J. Hilts, Birth Control Backlash, N.Y. TI1~S, Dec. 16, 1990 x 6
(Magazine), at 41, 55.
4
5Several reasons have been oered for the lack of interest in contraceptive devel-
opment. According to Roderick
L. Mackenzie, former president of Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. and
current chairman of GynoPharma, the small company that markets a copper
intra|uterine device (IUD), large companies abandoned the birth control busi-
ness because of the enormous challenges they faced. Noting that the industry
has not encountered a very encouraging atmosphere, Mackenzie suggests that
the increasing costs of litigation combined with criticisms from Congress, the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and women's groups, and the absence of
potentially lucrative research led pharmaceutical rms to leave the contracep-
tion market.'4 Generally, diculties encountered in four areas { product liability,
politics, testing, and funding { have contributed to the current state of contra-
ceptive development. Each of these problem areas will be discussed in detail
below.
III. Contraceptives Currently Available
To better understand the pressing need for additional methods of birth con-
trol, an examination of the methods currently available is necessary, including a
discussion of how the methods work, their safety, ecacy and popularity.'5 The
most eective methods of reversible contraception on the
~4Id.
'5Because women bear most of the burden of conception, they are the pri-
mary users of birth control. Consequently, the reader should assume that the
methods described are intended for use by women, unless otherwise noted.
5
6market today involve means of delivering forms of two female reproductive hor-
mones || estrogen and progesterone || to help regulate ovulation, the con-
dition of the uterine lining, and other parts of the menstrual cycle.'6 The most
popular contraceptive since 1969 is the birth control pill. Today there are ap-
proximately seventeen million Pill users in the United States, representing one-
quarter of all women of child-bearing age.'7 More than one-third of these women
are over thirty years old.'8
Two types of birth control pills are sold in the United States { combination
pills which include both estrogen and progestin (a synthetic form of proges-
terone), and mini-pills containing just progestin.'9 Combination pills prevent
pregnancy by preventing ovulation. Currently, there are nineteen dierent com-
bination pills on the market and their failure rate is about one to two percent.20
The mini|pills prevent pregnancy by reducing cervical mucus and causing it
to thicken, thereby hindering the sperm's ability to reach the ovum. Also, these
progestins keep the endometrium from thickening, preventing fertilized eggs
from implanting in the
'6Merle S. Goldberg, Choosing A Contraceptive, FDA CONSUI4ER, Sept.
1993, at 23.
'7serman, supra note 2, at 14.
18Highlights of the 1993 Annual Birth Control Study (Ortho Pharmaceutical
Corp., Raritan, N.J.), 1994. Ortho has been conducting annual birth control
studies since 1969. Its 1993 study surveyed 8,000 women ages 15 to 50 years and
then weighted the sample by age, marital status, and geographic distribution to
reect national demographics. Id.
~9Goldberg, supra note 16. 20Berman, supra note 2, at 14.
6
7uterus. The mini|pill has a one to three percent failure rate.2'
The average length of use for birth control pills is 5.5 years. Combination oral
contraceptives oer signicant protection against ovarian cancer, endometrial
cancer, iron| deciency anemia, pelvic inammatory disease, brocystic breast
disease, and ovarian cysts. Possible serious risks associated with use of the Pill
include blood clots, stroke, and heart attacks, especially if the user smokes and
is over thirty-ve years of age. Some studies indicate increased risk of breast
cancer, but the evidence remains equivocal.22 Minor side eects, which usually
subside after a few months' use, include nausea, headaches, breast swelling, uid
retention, weight gain, irregular bleeding, and depression.23
Women may also take a pill containing high doses of estrogen to cause an
almost immediate shedding of the endometrium and prevent implantation of the
fertilized ovum. This birth control method is usually employed as a postcoital
contraceptive, and is often referred to as the morning|after pill.24 It is simply
a variation on the usage of hormonal birth control pills and ordinarily involves
the ingestion of Ovral, i.e., 200 mg. of ethinyl estradiol, within seventy-two
hours of intercourse, followed by additional hormonal pills twelve hours later.25
Side eects
2 ~Goldberg, supra note 16.
22Ortho 1993 Study, supra note 18.
23Goldberg, supra note 16.
24Choice of Contraceptives, 34 MED. LETTER 111, 113 (1992).
7
8of Ovral and other high dosage hormonal contraceptives may include breast
tenderness, nausea and vomiting. Indeed, Ovral users risk vomiting the pills
before they take eect. Because it is essentially a dierent dosage of oral con-
traception, the potential long-term adverse eects of this method are the same
as those for other hormonal pills.26
Norplant oers women the option of an implant of the same hormones avail-
able in oral contraceptives. Approved by the FDA in 1990, Norplant involves
the surgical implantation of six matchstick|sized rubber capsules containing
progestin just underneath the skin of the upper arm. Norplant provides con-
traceptive protection for ve years, or until it is removed. Because the method
is not user|dependent, the failure rate for Norplant is less than one percent.
The potential risk factors and side eects are similar to those described for the
birth control pill.27
Depo Provera, an injectible form of progestin, was originally approved by the
FDA in the 1960s for the treatment of endometrial and renal cancers. While
it has been prescribed by physicians for contraceptive use for decades, it has
only had FDA approval as a contraceptive since 1992.28 Depo Provera must be
injected into a muscle in the buttocks or arm by a health care professional every
three months. Each injection provides contraceptive protection for fourteen
26Jan Homan, The Morning-After Pill, A Well-Kept Secret, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 10, 1993, S 6 (Magazine), at 12, 13.
27Goldberg, supra note 16, at 24.
28Advisory Panel Recommends Approval for Depo Provera, FDA TALK PA-
PER
(FDA, Rockville, Md.), June 19, 1992.
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9weeks, and this method has a failure rate of only one percent. The potential
risks and side eects are similar to those outlined for oral contraceptives and
Norplant.29
Intra-uterine devices (IUDs) are small plastic exible devices inserted into
the uterus through the cervix by a health care professional. Only two IUDs
are presently marketed in the United States { ParaGard T380A manufactured
by GynoPharma, which is a T-shaped device partially covered by copper and
eective for eight years, and Progestasert, a T|shaped device manufactured by
Alza that releases progestin over a one year period. Both IUDs have a four to
ve percent failure rate. Scientists are not certain how the IUD prevents preg-
nancy. Previously, researchers had reported that the IUD worked by making the
uterus inhospitable to implantation. However, more recent evidence indicates
that IUDs (particularly those containing copper) alter uterine and tubal uids
inhibiting the transport of sperm through the cervical mucus and uterus.30 The
TUD is recommended for women in mutually monogamous relationships be-
cause of links between the incidence of pelvic inammatory disease (PID) and
IUDs, particularly in women with multiple sex partners. In addition to PID,
other risks from IUDs include perforation of the uterus at time of insertion,
septic abortion, or ectopic pregnancy.3'
29Goldberg, supra note 16, at 24.
301d. at 24, 25.
3'Id.
9
10Each of the methods described above is considered to be a chemical method
of contraception, and each of them requires a prescription from a physician.
Presently, spermicides are the only chemical method of birth control available
without a prescription. Nonoxynol|9, the most commonly used spermicide
in the U.S., is a chemical surfactant that destroys the cell walls of sperm and
oers some protection against sexually transmitted diseases (STDs). Spermi-
cides come in several forms, including foam, vaginal suppositories, and jelly.
In addition, condoms are often lubricated with spermicide. The primary risk
associated with spermicides is local irritation in both men and women and/or al-
lergic reactions.32 The ecacy rate for contraception by spermicides used alone
ranges from seventy to eighty percent.33
In addition to the chemical means of preventing conception, there are ve
barrier methods: male condom, female condom, diaphragm, sponge and cervi-
cal cap. These methods work by keeping the sperm and ovum apart.34 The
male condom, relied upon by nineteen percent of all women, is the second most
frequently used method of reversible birth control. Available without a prescrip-
tion, the male condom has a failure rate of fteen percent, mostly as a result
of improper use.35 Statistics indicate that the majority of women who rely on
male condoms as their method of
32Choice of Contraceptives, supra note 24, at 113.
33Goldberg, supra note 16, at 19.
34Id.
35Goldberg, supra note 16, at 22.
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11contraception are under age thirty, and that forty-two percent of all women and
two-thirds of all unmarried women use condoms, often in addition to another
method, because of fears of STDs.36 Indeed, according to the FDA, the male
latex condom is the only form of birth control considered highly eective in
helping protect against human immuno|deciency virus (HIV) and STDs.37
The female condom, currently marketed by Wisconsin Pharmacal under
the name Reality was approved by the FDA in April 1993. This over-the|
counter product consists of a lubricated polyurethane sheath with a exible
polyurethane ring on each end. One ring is inserted into the vagina to cover
the cervix, while the other remains outside, partially covering the labia. The
estimated yearly failure rate for the female condom is twenty-one to twenty-six
percent. Although it is currently the only device women can use themselves to
guard against STDs, the female condom does not oer full protection against
disease.38 Other female condoms currently being tested are Women's Choice
which is similar to the Reality condom, but is made of latex, and the Bikini,
a latex pouch resembling underwear, which is pushed inside the vagina by the
penis.39 Potential side eects of
36Ortho 1993 Study, supra note 18.
37Goldberg, supra note 16, at 19. Consequently, in April, 1993, the FDA an-
nounced that oral contraceptives, Norplant, Depo Provera and IUDs must carry
labeling stating that these products are intended to prevent pregnancy but do
not protect against BIV infection or other STDs. Id. 38Goldberg, supra note
16, at 22.
39Choice of Contraceptives, supra note 24, at 114.
11
12male and female condoms include local irritation or allergic reactions 40
The diaphragm, a exible rubber disk with a rigid rim, covers the cervix
during and after intercourse. Diaphragms range in size from two to four inches
and women must be measured by a health care professional to ensure proper
t. The diaphragm used with spermicide has a failure rate of six to eighteen
percent.4' According to the 1993 Birth Control Study by Ortho Pharmaceutical
Corp., diaphragms are used by three percent of women of child-bearing age.42
Potential side eects of this method are bladder infections and toxic shock syn-
drome (TSS), a rare but potentially fatal infection.43
The contraceptive sponge, approved by the FDA in 1983, is made of polyurethane
foam, and shaped like a small doughnut. This over|the|counter product con-
tains spermicide Nonoxynol-9, and like the diaphragm, is inserted into the vagina
to cover the cervix during and after intercourse. The failure rate for the sponge
ranges from eighteen to twenty-eight percent, and use of the product exposes
women to the rare risk of TSS.44 Although two percent of all women of child-
bearing age had been using the sponge,45 recently American Home Products,
the only manufacturers of contraceptive sponges in the world, announced that
they were
40Goldlerg, supra note 16, at 22.
4~Id.
42Ortho 1993 Study, supra note 18.
43Goldberg, supra note 16, at 22.
44Id.
45Ortho 1993 Study, supra note 18.
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13discontinuing production for economic reasons. Apparently, the company felt
that prots from the sponge did not justify the expense of making their plant
comply with new FDA standards 46
The fth barrier method currently available is the cervical cap. Approved
by the FDA in 1988, the cervical cap is a dome-shaped device that ts over the
cervix. The cap comes in various sizes and women must be t by a health care
professional. The cap, with a failure rate of approximately eighteen percent,
may be more dicult to insert than the diaphragm, but it may be worn for
forty-eight hours, and can be used without a spermicide. Side eects of the cap
include unpleasant odors and/or discharge, an increased incidence of irregular
Pap tests during the rst six months of use, and the risk of TSS.47
Permanent surgical sterilization is the second most popular form of birth con-
trol among American women after the Pill. If sterilization rates for American
men and women are combined, then sterilization is the most popular contracep-
tive choice in the United States, selected by almost one-third of all Americans.48
Male sterilization is usually accomplished through a vasectomy, i.e., the sealing
of the vas deferens to prevent the travel of sperm to the penis. A vasectomy is
a minor surgical procedure usually performed in
460n1y Manufacturer Discontinues Sponge for Contraception, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 11, 1995, at A17.
47Goldberg, supra note 16, at 23.
48Bilts, supra note 13.
13
14less than thirty minutes in a physician's of f ice.49 Male sterilization is considered
safer than its female counterpart, tubal ligation. Tubal ligation requires an
operation under general anesthesia where a surgeon seals the Fallopian tubes
through clips, a plastic ring or an electric current. Major complications are rare,
occurring in only 1.7 percent of all cases.50 While the failure rate for sterilization
is less than one percent, the process is currently considered irreversible because
physicians have had limited success in reopening the vas deferens or Fallopian
tubes .
The natural family planning or rhythm method of birth control involves pe-
riodic abstinence during a woman's ten|day fertile period each month. The
ecacy of this method depends on the ability to identify correctly this pe-
riod of time. Two common methods of detection are the basal body tempera-
ture method and the cervical mucus (Billings) method. The body temperature
method requires a woman to monitor regularly her body so that she may detect
the drop in temperature during ovulation. Women using the Billings method
must recognize the changes in cervical mucus that indicate that ovulation is
occurring or has occurred.52 Periodic abstinence has none of the side eects of
articial methods of contraception. Nevertheless, this
49Goldberg, supra note 16, at 25.
501d.
5~Id.
52Id
14
15method has at least one major drawback. Although new electronic measure-
ment devices are now available to help make more accurate determinations, the
rhythm method fails up to forty|seven percent of the time.53
In addition to the methods currently available in the U.S., there are several
products that are either under development or have been targeted for research
by fertility specialists. The methods being developed for women include both
improvements on existing products, such as new hormonal methods (including
RU|486), medicated IUDs and short-term hormonal implants, as well as more
novel items like vaginal rings, anti|viral spermicides, and an anti|fertility
vaccine. An anti|fertility vaccine is also being considered for men. Other male
products presently in experimental stages are sperm suppressants containing
testosterone and/or cottonseed oil, and silicone sperm duct plugs.54
IV. Some Problems Evaluating Existing Methods of Con-
traception
An examination of the birth control methods currently available helps demon-
strate their limitations. Most notably, some methods appear to have unaccept-
able failure rates. Yet, while it is no doubt true that no mode of contraception is
fail|safe, taking the numbers at face value may be misleading because ecacy
rates for contraception are based on both
53Id.
54Herman, supra note 2, at 14.
15
16proper and improper use. For example, the failure rate for perfect use of oral
contraceptives is less than one percent. However, a sample of several thousand
women who were taking the Pill for a year may reveal a six percent rate of
pregnancy. This disparity reects the reality that many Pill users forget to take
one every day. Indeed, every contraceptive has two sets of statistics || the
failure rate for perfect use and the rate for typical use.55
Although the perfect and typical use rates are the same f or methods like
Depo Provera and Norplant where hormones are automatically released, the
gap in the statistics may be quite wide for methods requiring more user partic-
ipation and responsibility. For example, while spermicides are one of the most
eective options available, women tend to use these products incorrectly, so that
almost one|third of the women who rely on them become pregnant within a
year.56 Similarly, because of misuse, about one|fth of women depending upon
a diaphragm or condoms will become pregnant in the rst year.57
Because ecacy statistics reect disparities in proper use, women may have
diculty comparing accurately one method to another. A method with a high
rate of ecacy for perfect use may be so often used improperly, that its failure
rate is high. Moreover, contraceptive failure rates vary by age, marital status,
income, and lifestyle factors
55Malcolm Gladwell, Inside the Numbers On Birth Control, WASH. POST,
Dec.
28, 1992, at A3.
56Id
~Herman, supra note 2, at 13.
16
17such as smoking and frequency of intercourse. While the overall rst year preg-
nancy rate for all women using birth control is 13.8 percent, the rates vary
by age, with older women having the fewest instances of contraceptive failure.
Researchers attribute these statistics to the fact that skill and diligence in us-
ing birth control increases with age. In addition, for older women, intercourse
is usually more predictable or planned.58 Because of these variables, and the
disparities between populations who tested the products, comparisons among
products can only be estimates.59
In addition to product failures and misuse, consumers' attitudes also aect
conception rates. A 1986 study by the Alan Guttmacher Institute (AGI), a
New York-based, non-prot family-planning policy organization, surveyed 760
women from low-income groups and found that many of these women were
disinclined to use any method of birth control. These women had only lim-
ited knowledge about the Pill and IUD and feared the health risks of these
methods.60 Moreover, the study participants disliked barrier methods like the
diaphragm and condom because they felt that the products' lower ecacy rates
did not justify the discomfort the women would feel
58Gladwell, supra note 55. Failure rates also vary by marital status. Ac-
cording to a study by the Alan Guttmacher Institute, the unplanned pregnancy
rates by marital status are || married: 14.8%; previously married: 25.7%;
never married: 15.9%. See Painter, supra note 6. 59Gladwell, supra note 55.
60Bilts, supra note 13, at 55. Similarly, a Gallup poll commissioned by
a manufacturer of oral contraceptives found that women had several miscon-
ceptions about the risks and potential benets of Pill use. See, Misinformation
About Birth Control Pills is Widespread, Despite High Prevalence of Use , TIME
TO TALK (Organon, Inc., New York, N.Y.), Apr. 29, 1993.
17
18discussing birth control with their partners.6' This shyness about discussing
birth control has been described as a distinctly American phenomenon not ex-
perienced by women in other Western nations.62 Furthermore, this dierence
in attitude may account for the higher rates of unintended pregnancy in the
United States, particularly among teenagers, as compared to other industrial-
ized countries.63
Another part of the ecacy debate focuses on whether lower contraceptive
failure rates would result from more over-the|counter alternatives, or whether
advice or intervention from a health care professional regarding proper use of a
contraceptive increases its ecacy. On more than one occasion, the FDA has
considered the sale of over|the-counter oral contraceptives. Proponents of this
proposal note that oral contraceptives are actually safer than some drugs, such
as aspirin, which are easily accessible to consumers.65 Others suggest that re-
quiring a prescription for the Pill brings women into the doctor's oce, aording
physicians an opportunity to determine if the patients are appropriate candi-
dates for the Pill, and to educate them on proper Pill use. Moreover, requiring
a prescription for the most eective form of birth control available provides an
6'Bilts, supra note 13, at 55.
62Id
63Id
64Painter, supra note 6.
65Id
18
19incentive for women to undergo essential gynecological examinations 66
Finally, in addition to ecacy, attitudes and accessibility, health factors also
determine the adequacy of existing contraceptive options for certain groups of
women. For example, breast|feeding women are advised against using hor-
monal methods of birth control because of the possible eects of the hormones
on their babies. Hypertensive or diabetic women and women who are over age
thirty|ve and smoke are also advised not to use hormonal methods because
of increased health risks.67 In addition to these medical safety factors, lifestyle
also determines the suitability of certain methods. For example, women who
engage in intercourse only sporadically, e.g., teenagers, often see the Pill or IUD
as an inappropriately long-term option. Women with more than one partner
also have important lifestyle considerations, and need methods which protect
against both pregnancy and STDs.68
V. Problems Limiting New Development
A. Product Liability
Experts agree that one of the key factors limiting new development of con-
traceptives is the pharmaceutical companies' fear of litigation. Product liability
has
66Id
67serman, supra note 2, at 12|13.
68Id
19
20brought contraceptive research [in the United States] to a screeching halt, ac-
cording to Richard Lincoln of AGI.69
Reasons oered for the upsurge in product liability suits vary, with each
side of the debate blaming the other. The large pharmaceutical companies see
themselves as victims of greedy plaintis' attorneys. These industry represen-
tatives believe that they should be immune from suit once their product passes
the FDA regulatory process. Many have responded to the threat of lawsuits
by eliminating their contraceptive research departments and/or marketing their
contraceptives overseas. Small upstart research companies have also felt the
impact of these lawsuits. While they are not often targeted by plaintis' at-
torneys, they claim that the threat of litigation impairs their ability to obtain
liability insurance, and consequently, their ability to market their products.70
Plaintis' lawyers and consumer groups clearly have a dierent view. They
blame the lawsuits on the pharmaceutical industry, claiming that the companies
fail to test contraceptive products properly, provide unclear product labeling,
and target inappropriate products to certain populations. These parties allege
that the companies care little about women's health and that litigation is the
only means of pressuring manufacturers to make safer products. Moreover, they
believe that allowing companies to defend
69Michele Galen, Birth Control Options Limited by Litigation, NA!rL.
L.J., Oct. 20, 1986, at 1, 26.
701d.
20
21themselves based on compliance with FDA standards would enable the rms
to mask awed pre-market tests, particularly in light of the close relationship
between the FDA and industry.7'
The impasse between companies and consumers reects in part the long his-
tory of litigation involving contraceptives since the distribution of the Pill in
1960. Since the late 1960s, oral contraceptive users have sued manufacturers
sporadically, mainly for failing to warn of the risks of blood clots and stroke.72
However, the litigation problem mushroomed with the development and distri-
bution of the Dalkon Shield IUD by A.H. Robins in 197l.~~
When the Dalkon Shield was rst marketed, the FDA did not require pre|
screening of such medical devices for safety and ecacy. An apparent internal
design aw in the Dalkon Shield caused pelvic and uterine infections, ectopic
pregnancies, and infertility in thousands of women.74 Under
71Id.
72Plaintis have been successful in many of these failure to warn claims
over the years. See, e.g., Leibowitz v. Ortho Pharmaceutical CorD., 307 A.2d
449 (Pa. 1972); Lindsay v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Core., 481 F. Supp. 314
(E.D.N.Y. 1979); Ortho Pharmaceutical CorD. v. Chatman, 388 N.E.2d 541
(Ind. 1979); Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical CorD., 642 F.2d 652 (1st Cir.
1981); Odaers v. Ortho Pharmaceutical CorD., 609 F. Supp. 867 (E.D. Mich.
1985); MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corr., 475 N.E.2d 65 (Mass. 1985);
Reaves v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Core. 765 F. Supp. 1287 (E.D. Mich. 1991).
But cf. Henley v. FDA et al., No. CV 93| 5389, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 816
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 1995), (the court rejected plainti's claim that the FDA's
warning label requirements for oral contraceptives are inadequate and mislead-
ing because they fail to warn women of the link between estrogen and cancer,
particularly breast cancer.)
73Galen, supra note 69.
74Id. The debate on this issue continues, and in 1991, fertility scientists released
a study challenging the result of the reports used in the Dalkon Shield litigation
and asserting that the device does not increase the risk of pelvic infection.
Lawrence K. Altman, Study Finds
21
22pressure from the FDA, Robins discontinued sales of the product in 1974. Al-
though the FDA would have permitted continued sales of the product if the
rm maintained a user registry, the company declined this oer. Several years
later, Robins informed women still wearing the device that they should have
it removed.75 In 1985, after paying about $517 million for twenty|eight trial
judgments and 9300 settlements, and still facing 327,014 timely|led claims,
Robins led for bankruptcy.76 Subsequently, American Home Products Corpo-
ration acquired A.H. Robins, and created a $2.5 billion trust fund to compensate
claimants for damages from the Dalkon Shield.77
Unfortunately, the Dalkon Shield debacle was not an isolated event. The
Copper 7, a seven-shaped TUD manufactured by G.D. Searle from plastic and
copper, met a similar fate. Unlike the Dalkon Shield, the Copper 7 underwent
extensive premarket testing by the FDA before its approval by the agency in
1974. Nevertheless, this TUD was also linked to increased incidence of PID
which often leads to infertility. The Copper 7 generated hundreds of lawsuits
before it was pulled from the market in 1985.78
Doubt on Danger Arising from Use of IUDs, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 15, 1991,
at Al.
75Altman, supra note 74.
76Galen, supra note 69.
77Altman, supra note 74. American Home Products attempted to expedite
the compensation process by oering claimants non|negotiable settlements. If
claimants refused this oer, the dispute would be settled in court. Id.
78Galen, supra note 69, at 26, 27.
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2379Id.
80Id
8~Id.
Plaintis' lawyers complained that G.D. Searle made many of the same mis-
takes made by A.H. Robins with the Dalkon Shield { the company proered
inated ecacy claims, failed to warn about adverse side eects, and targeted
the wrong population of women. According to the plaintis, G.D. Searle mar-
keted the Copper 7 to young women who had never had children despite knowl-
edge gained through both clinical studies and the Dalkon Shield cases that this
population faced an increased risk of PID and should not use the IUD.79 Nev-
ertheless, plaintis' arguments seldom prevailed in court. Most of the cases
brought against G.D. Searle were settled; most of those that went to trial were
decided in the company's favor.80
Plaintis' attorneys explained these results by noting the high evidentiary
burdens faced by plaintis. In one case, Marder v. G.D. Searle, where seventeen
Copper 7 users brought suit against the manufacturer, the claimants rst had
to demonstrate that the Copper 7 doubled the chances of causing PID, ectopic
pregnancy, and perforation of the uterus before the judge would hear testimony
about the plaintis' injuries. Because the jury could not decide whether the
IUD increased by one hundred percent the risk of injuries, the judge directed a
verdict for the company.8'
Despite their legal victories, G.D. Searle decided to abandon the IUD market
in the U.S. Women who still wanted
23
24the product had to travel overseas.82 Plaintis' lawyers maintained that Searle's
response was too drastic. They asserted that the company simply needed to
modify its marketing strategy to focus on older women with children, and change
its product labeling to express all of the risks.83
Eventually, all the large rms manufacturing IUDs also bowed out, and for
almost three years, only one TUD, Alza's Progestasert remained on the market.
Alza maintained its market by rst restricting its sales to private physicians and
clinics that had used Progestasert in the past. Then, the company published
an extensive patient information sheet, modeled after informed consent forms
used in clinical trials. Before they could obtain a prescription for Alza's TUD,
women had to sign the sheet, certifying that they had read and understood the
risk information and had discussed any questions with a physician. With this
consent system in place, the company lifted its restrictions on sales. While some
patients led suits against Alza irrespective of the informed consent program,
the litigation was not of the magnitude that would bankrupt the company.84
Alza's success no doubt stemmed in part from their monopoly over the
821d. Searle discontinued sales of the Copper 7 in Canada in 1987. See
Morton Mintz, The Selling of an IUD { Behind the Scenes at G.D. Searle During
the Rise and Fall of the Copper 7, WAsH. POST, Aug. 9, 1988, (Health),
at 16. In addition to seeking replacements overseas, other former IUD users
took dierent approaches. According to one study, 45% of former IUD users
chose sterilization for themselves or their partners; 40% used other birth control
methods, and the remaining 15% used no method at all. Patricia Thomas, Break
Due After Decade of
Drought: Contraceptives, MED. WORLD NEWS, March 14, 1988, at 49, 50.
83Galen, supra note 69, at 27.
84Thomas, supra note 82.
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25American IUD market until the approval of the ParaGard T380A in 1988.85
Yet, even with the addition of this new IUD option, relatively few American
women (about one to two percent of those of child-bearing age)86 choose IUDs,
especially in comparison to the number of users in other parts of the world.87
At rst glance, it seems hard to fathom how an FDA| approved device like
the Copper 7 could encounter so many problems. Pharmaceutical companies
seeking FDA approval of a new contraceptive must complete an extensive and
expensive testing process. In 1986, the FDA estimated that this approval process
would take about eight years, and cost approximately $50 million.88 Current
estimates by pharmaceutical companies are even higher. According to a Tufts
University study, development of a new chemical entity, from synthesis of the
compound to market approval, takes about twelve years and as much as $231
million in (pre|tax) 1987 dollars.89 Nevertheless, testing does not necessarily
reveal all of the risks of a product, in part because the
851d. Following Alza's example, ParaGard also employs informed consent
forms for users. See Mintz, supra note 82.
86Ortho 1993 Study, supra note 18.
87Altman, supra note 74. A 1987 study found that about 84.5 million women
worldwide rely on IUDs for contraception, including approximately 11 million
women in developed nations. Id.
88Galen, supra note 69, at 28.
89rjew Chemical Entity R & D Costs Put at $231 Mil. in Tufts Study, With
About Half Attributed to Time Costs; Development Time Estimated at Twelve
Years, Food Drug and Cosm. L. Rep. (CCH), Pink Sheet, Apr. 23, 1990,
at 13-14. For the Tufts study, Jospeh DiMasi, Ph.D., collected data from 12
American pharmaceutical companies. The $231 million gure was derived by
adding out|of|pocket costs with time costs, i.e., the calculation of interest
lost on funds that might have otherwise been invested. Id.
25
26FDA's determination depends upon the data the agency receives. This data
is provided to the agency by both the manufacturers and the FDA'S advisory
committees of medical experts. Critics suggest that this system allows for ma-
nipulation by industry; in fact, in some cases, the FDA medical experts have
served as expert witnesses for industry in litigation.90
Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. provides an example of the problems
that may stem from the relationship between the FDA and industry.9' In 1982,
Mary Maihafer sued Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., on behalf of her daughter
Katie Wells, claiming that Maihafer's post|conception use of Ortho-Gynol,
the nation's largest selling spermicide, caused Wells' birth defects. Notably,
only months before the suit was led, the FDA'S Fertility and Maternal Health
Drugs Advisory Committee (FMHDAC) had determined that spermicides were
safe in such circumstances and that no warning was needed. Nevertheless, the
trial judge in Wells held for the plainti, awarding her $5.1 million in damages,
which were later reduced to $4.7 million on appeal.92
The judge in Wells explained that his holding reected his lack of faith in
Ortho's expert witnesses and the FMHDAC report. More specically, the judge
noted that a key defense witness who had served on FMHDAC had failed to
90Galen, supra note 69, at 28.
9'Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Core., 615 F. Supp. 262 (N.D. Ga. 1985),
a'd., 788 F.2d 741 (11th Cir. 1986).
92 Galen, supra note 69, at 28.
26
27disclose to FMHDAC that he had previously been consulted by Ortho, thereby
compromising the accuracy of the FMHDAC report. Ortho disputed the judge's
conclusion,93 and members of the National Institute of Child Health and Human
Development (NICHHD) decried the judge's failure to rely on scientic stan-
dards of proof.94 Still, the court's ndings reinforced the belief of many health
advocates about the unacceptably close relationship between industry and the
FDA. 9~
Indeed, this distrust of the FDA'S impartiality has inspired many women's
health advocates to reject industry's proposals for a regulatory compliance de-
fense whereby companies who obtained FDA approval for their product would
be immune from suit. These advocates believe that litigation is the only eec-
tive means of modifying industry behavior. They support this claim by referring
to the salutary eect that litigation has had on improving oral contraceptives.
When the Pill rst hit the market, women sued because of improper warnings
and side eects. Today, oral contraceptives come in safer dosages with stricter
warnings, and are rarely the subject of suit.96
93Id. The lawsuit did not prompt the company to remove its product from
the market. See Je Bailey, Johnson & Johnson Denying Reports, Says it
Won't Halt Sales of Spermicide, WALL ST. J., May 21, 1986, at 5. 94James L.
Mills & Duane Alexander, Teratogens and Litogens,' 313 NEW ENG. J. MED,
1235 (1986). The FDA also maintained its initial position on the safety of
spermicides, and perceived the Wells case as an aberration. See, Data Do Not
Support Association Between Spermicides, Birth Defects, FDA DRt~ BULL.,
Nov. 1986, at 21.
95Galen, supra note 69, at 28.
961d. See also, supra note 72.
27
28Whether or not lawsuits are an eective means of monitoring manufacturers,
they are clearly not a thing of the past. The latest product under attack is
Norplant, the hormonal contraceptive introduced by Wyeth|Ayerst in 1991.
Implantation of Norplant requires an incision in the arm after numbing the
area with a local anesthetic. Wyeth-Ayerst trained 28,000 physicians across
the country in the insertion and removal of the rods. However, the FDA has
not required all individuals who administer the contraceptive to undergo such
training.97
The popularity of Norplant quickly spread, and in its rst year more than
one million American women, and 2.5 million women worldwide, acquired the
implant. Initial reaction to the drug was positive. However, within the past few
years, television programs about women who suered painful removals of the
implant began airing, and the climate has changed dramatically. Over the past
two years, several class actions have been led across the country, and a federal
judge may consolidate them into a single national claim. 98
The women suing Wyeth-Ayerst claim that removal of the implant can be
lengthy and painful, and may leave ugly scars. Some physicians have corrobo-
rated these claims, noting that
97Herman, supra note 2, at 13.
981d. As of February 1995, class actions against Norplant have been
led in California, Chicago and Texas. See, Bill Kisliuk, Class Action
Filed Against Manufacturer of Birth Control Device, RZCORDER, Nov. 10,
1993, at 6; Norplant Suit Given Class Status, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., June
17, 1994, at 1; Texas Lawsuit Filed by Norplant Users, LIABILITY WK.,
Aug. 1, 1994.
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29the rods may be dicult to remove, requiring repeat visits, especially in in-
stances where the rods have migrated.99 In addition, the plaintis allege that
the company failed to warn women of these possibilities and sold Norplant to
physicians who received little or no training in removal.'00
Wyeth-Ayerst has responded to complaints by changing its product labeling
to include a listing of some potential adverse eects. Nevertheless, the com-
pany is contesting the lawsuits, asserting that doctors who properly insert and
remove the rods do not encounter any problems. Regardless of Wyeth-Ayerst's
assurances, the demand for Norplant has decreased, and many women who had
been using the drug without incident have requested premature removal, i.e.,
removal before the ve|year period has elapsed. Still, unlike the IUD manu-
facturers in the 1980s, Wyeth-Ayerst has no plans to abandon its product. In
fact, the company is planning to le a new drug application early this year for
Norplant II, an implant of two rods that provides three years of contraceptive
protection. In addition, Wyeth-Ayerst has a third product, a bio|degradable
implant that requires no removal, in the nal phase of clinical trials.'0'
Fears of lawsuits have extended beyond contraceptive manufacturers to ma-
terial suppliers as well. Dow Corning, a
99serman, supra note 2, at 16. ~00Id.
~0~Id. In addition, Organon Int'l, a small Dutch rm that markets some
of its contraceptive products abroad only, because of American litigiousness, is
monitoring closely the Norplant situation. Organon has a one rod implant that
lasts 2 years, and will base its decision to market its implant in the U.S. on the
results of the Norplant suits. Id.
29
30large chemical company, has reported that the rm will no longer manufacture
materials used in contraceptives. According to the company's director of corpo-
rate and external communications, [w]e made a conscious decision to exit that
entire market because of the litigious society.'02
In addition to discouraging new development among large pharmaceutical
companies, litigation also negatively aects small research rms by dissuading
insurance companies from covering contraceptive research and testing. Insur-
ance companies have canceled liability policies for small biotechnology rms in
response to the increase in lawsuits.'03 While such a blow may not be fatal to
large rms with reserves to cover these potential costs, small rms cannot pro-
ceed with testing unless they can nd doctors willing to assume liability or they
can obtain local government insurance, available in some states. This situation
places scientists in those states willing to insure research at an advantage over
their colleagues from states that will not take on this burden. In one case, fer-
tility scientists at the Research Triangle Institute in North Carolina who lost
their insurance responded by sending their data on a long-lasting bio-degradable
contraceptive implant to researchers at the University of California in San
~02Id at 13.
'03Michele Galen, Insurance Crisis Curbs Contraceptive Development, NAT'L
L.J., Oct. 20, 1986, at 28.
30
31Francisco because California ocials agreed to indemnify researchers at the state
university.'04
B. Politics
In addition to contending with the adverse eects of product liability lit-
igation, drug companies are also dissuaded from contraceptive development
because of negative political pressures. As Marc Deitch, medical director of
Wyeth|Ayerst Laboratories, noted, [ i] f you bring a new and novel treatment
for depression [to the market] ... you're hailed as bringing a wonder drug. With
contraception, you have to deal with social and religious issues that don't quite
make it a level playing eld in the United States.'05
Today, much of the political controversy in contraception surrounds mifepri-
stone, a drug produced by French pharmaceutical company Roussel|Uclaf, and
marketed as RU-486. While most of the hubbub stems from RU|486's use as
an abortifacient, the vehemence of the debate demonstrates the political tension
surrounding the development of drugs and devices which impact on reproduc-
tion.
Invented in 1982 by Roussel|Uclaf researcher Etienne| Emile Baulieu, RU-
486 prevents pregnancy by blocking the action of progesterone in the uterus and
ovary, causing early placental tissue to separate from the uterine wall. When
followed by oral prostaglandins, which cause the uterus to
~04Id.
'05Berman, supra note 2, at 16.
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32contract and expel the placental tissue, RU-486 becomes, the best abortifacient
ever devised.106 This two-pill method also makes abortion a more private pro-
cedure that can be performed in any physician's oce.'07 Because of its high
cost and unpredictable eects on subsequent menstrual cycles, RU-486's use as
a long-term contraceptive is still experimental.'08 Nevertheless, it appears to
have great promise as a post|coital contraceptive alternative, i.e., a so|called
morning after pill.'09
In 1983, the FDA rst granted investigational new drug (IND) approval for
mifepristone to the non-prot Population Council. At this time, the Council
worked with the World Health Organization (WHO) and Roussel-Uclaf to de-
termine the drug's eectiveness as a contraceptive. The last of these clinical
trials was held in 1986, and in 1988, Roussel reported that it was not pursuing
U.S. FDA approval for political reasons 
The company's reluctance to enter the American market was understand-
able considering the uproar that Roussel encountered in France when the rm
initially oered RU|486 as an abortion alternative. After six years of testing
on
'06Patricia Thomas, French Abortifacient Still Too Hot for U.S., MED.
WORLD NEWS, Mar. 14, 1988, at 63.
'07Jill Smolowe, New, Improved and Ready for Battle, TIME, June 14, 1993, at
48.
'08Thomas, supra note 106.
'09Allan Roseneld, Mifepristone (RU-4 86) in the United States: What does
the Future Hold?, 328 NEW ER3. J. MED. 1560 (1993). Moreover, the drug
may also be useful in treating other conditions, including progesterone tumors
of the breast, ovary, endometrium, and prostate, as well as Cushing's syndrome,
a potentially fatal metabolic disorder. See Thomas, supra note 106.
0Thomas, supra note 106.
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33more than 17,000 women, the French government allowed RU|486 for public
use in September 1988. The news unleashed a fury from the press, a deluge
of letters from Roman Catholic doctors and a Church-sponsored protest in the
streets of Paris. A month later, Roussel pulled the drug from the market in an
eort to end the controversy.'
Withdrawal of the product did not silence the debate. Indeed, doctors
around the world were distressed by the pharmaceutical company's action. That
same October, participants at a medical congress in Rio de Janeiro circulated a
petition demanding that the French government reverse Roussel|Uclaf's deci-
sion. Within forty-eight hours, French Health Minister Claude Evin responded,
ordering Roussel to resume distribution of RU-486.2 By 1989, the drug was
made available to all licensed abortion clinics and hospitals in France. Over the
next three and a half years, 100,000 French women used the drug successfully.
Indeed, only one serious incident was reported || a heavy smoker suered a
heart attack when trying to abort her thirteenth
3
pregnancy.
Although the French government encouraged development of
RU-4 86, they placed restrictions on its use. French clinics may only pre-
scribe RU|486 within the rst trimester of pregnancy. Moreover, distribution
of the drug requires four
1Smolowe, supra note 107, at 50.
113Id. This case prompted the French government to prohibit the use of
RU|486 for heavy smokers or women over 35, sub|populations who have
higher risks of complications. Id.
33
34clinic visits over a three|week period.4 Even with these conditions, French
women have chosen RU|486 over surgery in eighty-ve percent of the cases.
The generally positive results in France led to the approval of RU|486 in Britain
and Sweden, and testing of the drug in other countries, including India and
China.5
Improvements in the administration of RU|486 in 1991 led to further con-
troversy. Originally, women received the prostaglandins accompanying RU-486
in the form of an injection. However, in 1991, Roussel researchers found that
using an oral prostaglandin marketed by American pharmaceutical company
G.D. Searle was cheaper, more private and more eective. When Roussel-Uclaf
balked at performing clinical trials for the new method because of political pres-
sures, the French government again required the rm to continue testing and
also agreed to defray insurance costs.6 Like the managers at Roussel, executives
at G.D. Searle were uncomfortable with their connection to RU|486. As a
result, the company wrote a letter to the editor of The Wall Street Journal in
March 1993 stating, [i]t is not Searle's
'~4Id. at 51. The rst visit includes a gynecological exam to determine
the stage of pregnancy, as well as a counseling session on abortion. After a
one|week reection period, patients return to the clinic to obtain the RU-486
tablets, sign a government form requesting abortion, and complete a Roussel-
Uclaf consent form indicating knowledge of the risks to the fetus if the abortion
is not carried to completion (though as of yet, no birth defects have been found
in the small number of babies born to women who took the drug). After 48
hours, the patient must go back to the clinic for prostaglandins. Eight to ten
days later, she has a nal follow-up visit to ensure that no part of the egg
remains in her body. Id.
~~5Id. at 50.
34
35intention or desire to become embroiled in the abortion issue. 117
Despite its increasing popularity abroad, domestic politics have slowed the
entrance of RU-486 into the U.S. In June 1989, the FDA imposed an importation
ban on the drug, partly in response to letters from inuential anti-abortion
Congressmen.8 Noting that several IND applications for research on RU-486
had been approved, the agency claimed that the ban only prohibits importation
of RU|486 for personal use. Moreover, the FDA insisted that the ban had been
imposed for safety reasons, i.e., to ensure that RU|486 was not brought into
this country surreptitiously for use as an abortifacient without proper medical
supervision.9
Despite these claims, the agency's actions caused an uproar among researchers
who relied on the drug for their studies. These scientists suggested that FDA
policy limiting access to RU-486 hindered their progress, and made Roussel|
Uclaf reluctant to work with them.'20 The FDA importation ban also upset fem-
inist and reproductive rights groups seeking access to the drug for individual
use. Congressional hearings on the issue were held, but no change was made in
~~7Id. at 51.
8Denise Chicoine, RU-486 in the United States and Great Britain, A
Case Study in Gender Bias, 16 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 81, 94-95
(1993). Within three weeks of receiving angry letters from Reps. Robert
K. Dornan (R-CA), Henry Hyde (R-IL), and John LaFalce (D-NY),
and Sen.
Jesse Helms (R|NC), requesting restrictions on access to RU-486, the FDA
Commissioner issued the importation ban. Id.
119FDA Did Not Intend to Halt RU 486 Research, Agency Testies; 10 IND
Applications Approved for Research, Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep. (CCH), Blue
Sheet, Nov. 21, 1990, at 6|7.
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36ocial policy.'2' In addition, the ban was challenged unsuccessfully in the courts
in 1992 by a pro|choice group called Abortion Rights Mobilization (ARM).'22
Some changes in policy have occurred with the change in administration,
but progress has been slow. As one of his rst ocial acts, President Clinton
issued a memorandum on January 22, 1993, directing the Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS) to consider the testing and licensing of RU-486 in
the U.S. In April 1993, negotiations began between representatives of the FDA,
Roussel|Uclaf, and the Population Council. The talks culminated more than
one year later in Roussel|Uclaf's donation of its patent rights for RU-486 to
the Population Council, with the understanding that the Council would take
the steps necessary to bring the drug to market.'23 By this time, several state
legislatures had volunteered their states as test sites.'24
'21Chicoine, supra note 118, at 98. In February 1992, Representative Ron
Wyden (D-OR) introduced the RU-486 Regulatory Fairness Act in Congress.
The goal of the measure was to make the FDA Import Ban ineective as to
RU-486. Senator Alan Cranston (D-CA) subsequently sponsored the same bill
in the Senate. See also, 138 CoNG. REC. S2337 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 1992).
'22Smolowe, supra note 107, at 51. When ARM helped Leona Benten a pregnant
29 year|old social worker from California, obtain a dose of RU| 486 in Eng-
land and attempt to bring it into the US, American custom ocials seized the
pills. The case was eventually heard by the Supreme Court. The Court refused
to order the government to return the pills, and Benten had a surgical abortion.
Leona Benten v. David Kessler. Comm'r. FDA, 112 5. Ct. 2929 (1992) (per
curiam). '23Roussel Uclaf Donates U.S. Patent Rights for RU-486 to Popu-
lation Council, BBS NEWS (U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., Wash.,
D.C.), May 16, 1994. BBS's announcement of the donation quoted BBS Sec'y
Donna Shalala stating, [wie strongly believe that women in America should have
access to the full range of safe and eective alternatives to surgical abortion ...
[nevertheless] the donation does not mean RU|486 has been approved for use
in the United States. Id. Furthermore, an accompanying BBS fact sheet com-
mented on the strict distribution rules in eect in the countries where RU-486
is currently available, noting that such conditions would also apply in the US.
Mifepristone (RU-486):
36
37Responsibility for making RU-486 available in this country now lies with the
Population Council.125 The Council must nd a U.S. manufacturer before it
can apply for a new drug application with the FDA.'26 Although extensive tri-
als have already been performed worldwide, including a multi-center study by
WHO, the FDA has predicted that the approval process will take two to three
years.'27 One option the Council is considering is a proposal by RU|486 in-
ventor Baulieu to establish a non|prot foundation whose sole function is to
manufacture and distribute RU-486 worldwide. Such an organizational struc-
ture would insulate the RU|486 producer from political pressures by making
boycott threats irrelevant.'28
While RU-486 has captured national attention as an abortifacient, the Na-
tional Academy of Science's Institute of
Brief Overview, BBS F~T SHEET (U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs.,
Wash., D.C.), May 16, 1994.
'24Smolowe, supra note 107, at 49.
'25David Van Biema, But Will it End the Abortion Debate?, TIME, June
14, 1993, at 52, 53. Although President Clinton has expressed some interest in
promoting pro|choice policies, the FDA has not rescinded its ban on impor-
tation of RU|486 for personal use. See, Susan Jacobs, Hurry Up and Wait
Characterizes RU|486 Status Today, 85 J. NA~'L CA1~ER INST. 1110, 1111
(1993).
'26Van Biema, supra note 125. '27Roseneld, supra note 109.
'28Van Biema, supra note 125, at 53. There is some irony in the vehemence
of the protests surrounding RU-486, the drug that was intended in part to
end the protests. Nevertheless, activists on both sides of the RU-486 debate
are determined that their respective views will prevail. Proponents of RU-
486 are hoping that the privacy of the new method will encourage physicians
who have stopped performing abortions for fear of political consequences to
resume the practice. We will not allow anti|choice zealots to deny RU|486 to
American women, said Pamela Maraldo, president of Planned Parenthood Fed'n
of America. In contrast, anti-abortion activists have vowed to nd the doctors
dispensing RU|486 and picket them. As Rev. Keith Tucci of Operation Rescue
Nat'l noted, [wihen they invent new ways to kill children, we will invent new
ways to save them. Smolowe, supra note 107, at 49, 53.
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38Medicine is encouraging the further testing of mifepristone both as a long-
term contraceptive like the birth control pill, and as a post|coital method.
Preliminary results from studies of the latter use appear particularly promis-
ing. Mifepristone seems to be more eective than the current post|coital op-
tions, and unlike the other methods currently available, it involves only a single
dosage.'29
Of course, marketing RU|486 for use as a post-coital contraceptive may not
mitigate any of the controversy surrounding the drug. Indeed, the morning after
method most frequently used today, which consists of highly concentrated doses
of female hormones, has also been the subject of political disputes. The post|
coital contraceptive, rst described in Canadian and Dutch studies twenty years
ago, works by interfering with normal reproductive processes either to prevent
fertilization or to stop fertilized eggs from implanting in the uterus.'30 Such
drugs are widely available in Europe, and according to experts, the products'
accessibility abroad helps account for those countries' lower unplanned preg-
nancy rates.'3'
In contrast, in the United States, this form of birth control remains somewhat
of a secret, mostly because no drug has been approved by the FDA for post|
coital use.'32 Ovral,
'29Potential Benets of RU 486, Other Antiprogestins Are Extensive
(Inst. of Medicine, Wash., D.C.), Sept. 7, 1993. '30Homan, supra note 26,
at 12|13.
~31Id. at 14.
'32 Id. The FDA has published guidelines regarding the post-coital use of
DES. See, infra p. 52.
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39manufactured by Wyeth|Ayerst, is the most commonly used post| coital
contraceptive in this country. Ovral was approved as a long|term oral contra-
ceptive in 1968, and no company has applied for permission to promote or label
it for any other use.'33 As a result, while Ovral is widely prescribed on college
campuses, and routinely prescribed to rape victims in hospital emergency rooms
for post-coital use, many physicians are unfamiliar with it. Moreover, without
ocial federal approval, Ovral cannot be dispensed for post|coital use at the
four thousand federally funded Title X clinics. Thus, these clinics ' four million
(largely indigent) patients have no access to the product.'34
Manufacturers' reluctance to market a morning after pill may reect popular
ambivalence about post-coital intervention. People disagree about whether a
drug taken after intercourse is more akin to contraception or abortion; individual
beliefs on this question reect dierent views on when conception begins.'35 To
further complicate the matter, a woman takes a post|coital contraceptive even
before she is certain that fertilization has occurred. Finally,
~33Id. at 30.
134Id. at 14.
135Id. at 30. The National Right to Life Committee has dened conception
as fertilization, i.e., as contact of spermatozoon with ovum. This perception
is shared by some Catholic hospitals which refuse to prescribe morning after
pills. Other groups, including the American College of Obstetricians and Gy-
necologists, consider implantation, rather than fertilization, as conception. Id.
See also, Browneld v. David Freeman Marina BosD., 208 Cal. App. 3d 405
(1989), (when a rape victim sued a Catholic hospital for refusing to prescribe a
post-coital contraceptive, the state appellate court held for the plainti, nding
that the method is preventive, and not equivalent to abortion).
39
40there is some resistance to the idea that such a drug enables women to eliminate
the consequences of accidents.'36
In addition to inspiring ethical debate, the morning after pill faces other
problems. Industry representatives note that while clinical trials and agency
review for a new drug takes about twelve years and more than $231 million,
obtaining approval for a supplementary use could take ve more years and
additional tens of millions of dollars.'37 Moreover, once the patent on a drug
expires, the product may be copied by other rms who did not have to make
the initial multi-million dollar investment. Pharmaceutical rms would have
particular diculty recouping their investment for products intended for post|
coital use because women who use them often do so only once in their lifetime.138
Pharmaceutical rms' may also be dissuaded from seeking approval for post-
coital methods by the negative reactions that such products have inspired from
women's groups. In 1975, the National Women's Health Network (NWHN)
demonstrated against the FDA, claiming that the agency had applied insucient
scrutiny to high estrogen regimens.'39 In
1361d. at 14. Felicia Stewart, author of Contraceptive Technoloav, has
expressed concern that much opposition to post|coital drugs stems from
the view that women should not be able to undo their mistakes. In response to
individuals who share that perspective, she states:
I
t's only in the area of sex that we get involved in the ethics of promoting risk|
taking, the idea that we should withhold information or devices because we
don't want people to need them. Would you make the same argument about
cholesterol drugs? Saying, if we give people a drug that will reduce cholesterol,
they won't be as likely to exercise and eat properly like they really should?
Id. at 15.
~37Id. at 30.
138Id
139Id.
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411980, NWHN organized a letter-writing campaign to demand that the FDA
conduct safety studies on post-coital estrogens before releasing the drugs to the
public, and the network maintains its wariness towards hormonal products to
this day.'40 Even proponents of post-coital contraceptives have expressed con-
cern with the products currently available. Their complaints focus on the drugs'
side eects and limited ecacy, as well as their fear of women's reliance on a
method that does not protect them from HIV and other STDs. Because of these
shortcomings, many clinics require informed consent forms before dispensing
post|coital contraception, viewing the drugs only as an emergency method.'4'
While abortion is currently the big political issue plaguing contraceptive
development, political controversies have long accompanied advances in birth
control. When the Pill was rst distributed in 1960, the FDA was quick to
distance itself from any position on the morality of preventing childbirth. In
press statements issued at the time, the agency asserted that neither the FDA
nor the Department of Health, Education and Welfare advocate or discourage
the use of contraceptive products. ... We are in all aspects neutral on this
subject.'42 As it turned out, the FDA'S circumspection was misguided. The
Pill did not inspire the expected outrage from parties morally opposed to
~40Id
1'~~Id. at 15.
'42Suzanne White, FDA's Approval of the Contraceptive Pill 22 (July 1992)
(draft, on le with the Food and Drug Administration).
41
42the prevention of childbirth.'43 Instead, its development provoked charges that
the FDA was unconcerned with women's health.
For years, feminists had championed the development of a birth control pill
that would put reproductive choices in the hands of women. Yet soon after
the Pill appeared on the market, it inspired criticism from these same groups.
Within the rst few years of the Pill's distribution, researchers recognized that
the original Pill composition provided an overdose of hormones and caused
unnecessary side eects. Nevertheless, doctors continued to prescribe it, and
feminists believed these actions demonstrated physicians' callousness towards
women.1 ~
Public concern about the safety of the Pill increased over time. In 1970,
Senator Gaylord Nelson (D|WI) of the Senate Select Committee on Small
Business began Congressional hearings on the safety of the Pill, as part of his
larger investigation of the pharmaceutical industry.'45 Simultaneously, women
were mobilizing to educate and protect themselves and others. In 1969, Bar-
bara Seaman published The Doctor's Case Against the Pill. During this same
period, the rst editions of Our Bodies. Ourselves also became available. In
addition, in 1975, Barbara Seaman and Belita Cowen established the National
Women's Health Network (NWHN) as a full|time feminist health lobby in
Washington, D.C.
143Id.
'~Bilts, supra note 13, at 70.
'45CARL DJERASSI, THE POLITICS OF CONTRACEPTION 91|93 (1979).
42
43NWHN remains a prominent voice in health politics, and continues to caution
against hormonal methods of birth control, advocating instead the use of barrier
methods and spermicides 146
The controversy surrounding Depo Provera provides yet another example of
the politicization of birth control. In 1974, the FDA proposed approving Depo
Provera as a contraceptive. This proposal followed years after Depo Provera was
approved as a cancer drug in this country, and after it had proved to be a safe
and eective contraceptive in other nations.'47 The FDA'S proposal inspired a
strong adverse reaction from feminist groups who feared unwanted side eects
from the drug. This feminist campaign led the FDA to defer its decision until
1978.'~~ That year, the FDA denied Upjohn's application for approval, citing
clinical tests that showed that the drug caused tumors in dogs.'49 The FDA's
action upset manufacturers who felt that the agency had cowed too easily to
political pressure over a drug that the agency had initially agreed was safe
and eective.'50 Although physicians continued to prescribe Depo Provera for
its unapproved use as a contraceptive,'5' pharmaceutical companies viewed the
FDA's action as a major deterrent to contraceptive research. These feelings
were reinforced in
'46Bilts, supra note 13, at 70.
147Id.
'48Id
149Advisory Panel Recommends Approval for Depo Provera, supra note 28.
150Id
'5'Kristin Neil, The Depo Provera Battle, THE NE~1WORK NEWS (Nat'l
Women's
Health Network, Wash., D.C.), Sept./Oct. 1992, at 5.
43
441985, when Upjohn reapplied for approval, and their application was again
denied.'52
In June 1992, an advisory committee of the FDA recommended approval of
Depo Provera.'53 Several groups testied against this decision, including the Na-
tional Women's Health Network, the National Black Women's Health Project,
the National Latina Health Organization and Women's Economic Equity. These
organizations presented studies linking long-term use of the drug to cancer and
osteoporosis, and expressed concerns as well about Depo Provera's short-term
side eects.'54 Despite the opposition, the FDA approved Depo Provera for con-
traceptive use in 1992, eighteen years after the agency had initially proposed
approval.'55
Alongside the traditionally controversial issues associated with contracep-
tion, i.e., abortion, sexual mores and women's health concerns, a fairly new
debate has arisen concerning issues of social control. This debate focuses pri-
marily on the use of Depo Provera and Norplant, long-term contraceptives that
require little user participation. Notably, the women's groups that opposed
Depo Provera for health reasons also feared that the drug would be used for
custodial convenience.156 In other words, they worried that
'52Bilts, supra note 13, at 70.
'53Advisory Panel Recommends Approval for Depo Provera, supra note 28.
The Advisory Panel's recommendation followed WHO's 1991 conclusions that
studies describing the negative eects of Depo Provera on dogs are inapposite
because of the physiological dierences between dogs and women. Id.
'54Neil, supra note 151. 155Goldberg, supra note 16, at 24. '56Neil, supra
note 151.
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45because of its high ecacy rate as a contraceptive, Depo Provera would be
prescribed for women in prison and mental institutions without regard for its
eects on these women. Because of its similarly high rate of ecacy, the same
concerns about institutional use have also been associated with Norplant.
In fact, because one insertion of Norplant lasts for ve years (as opposed
to Depo Provera where each injection lasts only three months),'57 this drug
has served as the focal point for much of the discussion about the use of con-
traception for social control. Only a few weeks after Norplant's approval, an
editorial in The Philadelphia Inquirer suggested that Norplant could be a use-
ful tool for reducing the underclass.'58 While the newspaper later apologized
for its statements, the editorial apparently struck a chord in many people con-
cerned about the increasing social and nancial costs of caring for poor and
abused children.'59 From 1991 through 1992, thirteen state legislatures spon-
sored twenty bills oering more public assistance to women on welfare who use
Norplant. In 1993, seventeen such measures were proposed in ten states, and at
least two were enacted.'60 In California, the governor took
'57Goldberg, supra note 16, at 24.
158Stacey L. Arthur, The Norplant Prescription: Birth Control, Woman
Control or Crime Control?, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1, 4 (1992).
159Lynn Smith & Nina J. Easton, The Dilemma of Desire, L.A. TIMES,
Sept.
26, 1993, (Magazine), at 24.
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46measures to make the contraceptive easily available to teenagers and female
drug abusers.'6'
The controversy surrounding the potential for Norplant's societal use came
to a head in February 1991, when a California judge required use of Norplant
as part of a criminal sentence. In People v. Johnson, Judge Howard Broadman
ordered the defendant, a convicted child abuser to have Norplant inserted for
three years as a condition of her probation.'62 While Johnson initially accepted
this condition, one week later she moved for reconsideration and modication
of the order. Johnson's motion was denied and she appealed.'63 Her appeal gar-
nered national attention, as well as the support of civil and reproductive rights
groups, including the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and Planned Par-
enthood, who considered the order an unconstitutional infringement of John-
son's freedom. Before the appeal was argued, Johnson violated her probation
by testing positive for cocaine on three occasions. Based on these violations, the
court rescinded the probation order, sentenced Johnson to ve years in prison,
and dismissed as moot her appeal of the conditions of her probation.'64
A similar order was made by a Nebraska court in April 1991, when a de-
fendant was required to use Norplant as condition of her probation after she
allowed her boyfriend to
'61Arthur, supra note 158, at 5.
'621d. citing People v. Johnson (Cal. Super. Ct. Tulare County 1991)
(No. 29390).
'63Arthur, supra note 158, at 16, 17.
'641d at 18.
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47murder her six|month old son.'65 In this case, the order was later modied to
allow the defendant to use any form of birth control.'66 This modication essen-
tially made the order unenforceable. In light of the failure rates of contracep-
tives, the court would not be able to assess the defendant's compliance. Judges
have also mandated Norplant use in other states, including Texas, Florida and
Illinois.'67
Some commentators see both the legislative proposals and the judicial or-
ders as practical means of reducing social welfare costs while protecting children,
born and unborn, from abuse.'68 Still, civil and reproductive rights groups have
been quick to express their opposition, describing the measures as discriminatory
and comparing them to unlawful forced sterilization.'69 The American Medical
Association (AMA) has also opposed requiring the use of Norplant. Represen-
tatives from the AMA stated, [t]here is not sucient evidence to demonstrate
that long|acting contraceptives are an eective social response to the problem
of child abuse.'70
The controversy about the prescription of Norplant has continued unabated.
In 1993, black religious leaders opposed a proposal to oer Norplant in Balti-
more's inner|city schools where most students were black, describing the plan
1651d. at 6, 21, citing State v. Carlton. (Neb. County Ct., Lincoln
County 1991)(No. CR9O|1937).
167Smith & Easton, supra note 159.
168Id
'691d.
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48as a form of social engineering.'7' Concerns about discriminatory prescription
of the implant have led the Los Angeles Regional Family Planning Counsel to
train counselors to consider their own biases before recommending Norplant
to teenagers or drug abusers.'72 Moral issues aside, public health experts have
found that low-income minority women may be particularly poor candidates for
Norplant because of health reasons. Poor women often have health conditions
like obesity, high blood pressure and diabetes, which make Norplant a risky
choice. Moreover, black women are especially prone to cervical cancer and the
warning signs of irregular bleeding may be masked by the use of Norplant.'73
Generally, some commentators see oering women Norplant as tantamount to
increasing their chances of succeeding in life, by preventing the problems of
unwanted pregnancy. Others feel that advocating Norplant encourages irre-
sponsible promiscuity and/or implies that women cannot, and should not be
permitted to, control their own sexuality.
In addition to expressing concern that contraceptives are used as a form
of social control, some experts believe that the snail's pace of contraceptive re-
search reects gender bias.'74 One commentator noted that it was not until 1937
that the AMA passed a resolution declaring the medical profession's armative
duty to inform women about
'71Mimi Hall, Norplant Causes Furor in Baltimore, USA TODAY, Feb. 9,
1993, at 3A.
'72Smith & Easton, supra note 159. '73Id.
'74Chicoine, supra note 118, at 100, nn.150|151.
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49contraception.'75 Moreover, some people believe that the delays in contraceptive
development are symptomatic of a general disregard for women's health issues
in this country. One expert expressing the low priority given to women's health
issues, suggested that the systematic exclusion of women from health care train-
ing until late in this century has adversely aected research and treatment of
women's health concerns in the U.S.'76
Attributing the paltry amount of funding for contraceptive research to soci-
etal indierence to women's health concerns, experts cite studies which indicate
that federal money spent on female sterilization has far outweighed the fund-
ing devoted to the development of new modes of contraception.'77 As late as
the 1980s, practitioners provided accounts from communities where tubal lig-
ations were routine for all woman at age twenty|one because the operations
were covered by Medicaid.'78 Finally, some commentators reduce much of the
controversy surrounding new methods of contraception, as well as the delays
in development, to the fact that most of the beneciaries of these products are
women, while most of the decision|makers,
'75White, supra note 142, at 25. In addition, the issue of individuals' right
of access to contraception has been the subject of much litigation. See, e.g.,
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438 (1972); and Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977). How-
ever, this debate over constitutional rights is beyond the scope of this paper.
'76Chicoine, supra note 118, at 100 nn.150|151.
177Id. at 101 n.155. The author also reports that hysterectomies are the
most commonly performed operation of the 20th century and have been found
to have been unnecessary in 60% of the cases. Id. at 101. '781d. at 101 n.156.
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50from politicians to regulators to pharmaceutical company executives, are men.'79
C. Testing
In addition to the legal and political problems hindering the industry's de-
velopment of new forms of contraception, there are practical obstacles as well,
including strict clinical testing requirements. According to Roderick L. Macken-
zie, former president of Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., today, it would take a
study of 50,000 women over ten years to develop a contraceptive comparable to
the Pill or IUD.'80
To obtain new drug approval in the United States, a pharmaceutical com-
pany must complete a several stage process. The process begins with preclinical
investigations and animal testing, followed by clinical testing in several phases
with increasingly larger population samples, and ends with nal review by the
FDA.'8' Traditionally, the FDA does not allow contraceptive manufacturers ac-
cess to any of the short cuts which may be permitted for manufacturers of drugs
created to treat disease, because birth control products are intended
179Id. at 111.
'80Herman, supra note 2, at 14.
'81Chicoine, supra note 118, at 87. There are three main phases of testing: the
goal of Phase I testing is to collect basic data on the safety of the new drug by
conducting tests on a small group (100 or fewer) of healthy subjects; in Phase
II, researchers focus on the ecacy and short|term side eects of the new drug
by conducting tests on several hundred patients who are divided into treatment
and control groups; Phase III involves thousands of patients over a period of
years, and is intended to establish the drug's eectiveness, its long|term side
eects, and its optimal dosage levels. Id. at 87 n.41.
50
51for use in healthy people.'82 As noted by Carl Djerassi, the scientist who rst
synthesized the Pill in 1951, [c]ancer patients are willing to tolerate side eects
because they hope the drugs will save their lives. People do not, however,
consider unwanted pregnancies a disease and are not prepared to take risks.'83
Perhaps more interesting than the American process itself is how it com-
pares to the system used in Great Britain, a country with a shorter lag time for
drug development and more contraceptive choices, yet similar morbidity and
mortality rates as the U.S.'84 The preclinical testing phase in the U.S. takes
twice as long as the one in Britain, mostly because the FDA requires submis-
sion of both domestic and foreign data for preclinical and clinical trials, while
Britain's Committee on the Safety of Medicines (CSM) permits the use of foreign
data alone.'85 The FDA is a more reactive agency than CSM, and unlike CSM,
which is considered to act independently of political leaders or pharmaceutical
companies,'86 the FDA will not begin evaluating a drug until a manufacturer
submits a new drug application for approval. While critics describe the FDA as
more subject to political pressures than its British counterpart, the ip
182Elizabeth Sweetenham, Fear of Litigation Is Hindering New Contracep-
tive Research, OBSERVER, June 5, 1994, at 6.
184 Chicoine, supra note 118, at 91.
1851d. at 87.
'861d. at 88. However, nancial links have been found between some mem-
bers of the Committee and the pharmaceutical companies. Id. n.50.
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52side of this position is that the American agency feels a greater sense of govern-
ment accountability.'87
As a consequence both of this sense of duty, and the American tort liability
system, the main dierence between the American and British approval process
is that the FDA focuses on premarket screening, while CSM relies on post-
market surveillance. FDA reviewers work under the premise that they have
little or nothing to lose by refusing, or at least delaying, the grant of a license,
and everything to lose if [al thalidomide [is approved].'88 In contrast, British
regulators concentrate on monitoring the eects of a product after it has been
approved. CSM policy presumes that serious rare side eects will not appear
until a large population has used a drug. Moreover, Britain's nationalized health
care program and the size of its population facilitate post|market surveillance
because of the ease in tracking the activities of each doctor and patient in the
system.'89
Although the FDA is primarily a reactive organization, in one notable in-
stance, the regulation of diethylstilbestrol (DES) as a post|coital contracep-
tive, the agency adopted a pro-active approach similar to the one associated
with Britain's CSM. When DES was initially approved as safe for use in human
medicine in 1941, the FDA did not demand any proof of safety or ecacy.'90
Between 1945 and 1955, DES
1871d. at 88|89.
'88Id at 88|89 n.57.
1891d at 88.
190P.B. Butt, DES: FDA and the Law, in ORIGINS OF HUMAN CANCER,
BOOK C:
HUMAN RISK ASSESSMENT, 1651 (B.B. Hiatt et al. eds., 1977).
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53was commonly prescribed for prevention of miscarriage.'9' By 1962, the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 had been amended to require that drugs be
tested for ecacy. Within the next few years, studies were released linking the
use of DES during pregnancy to cancer, both in the women who used the drug
and their female of f spring.'92 Although the FDA responded to these reports by
demanding that DES be labeled as inappropriate for use during pregnancy,'93
physicians were still prescribing the drug for its unapproved use, as a post|
coital contraceptive.'94
For the reasons described above,'95 manufacturers are reluctant to pursue
new drug applications (NDAs) for post| coital methods of contraception. Thus,
in 1973, the FDA decided to initiate its own evaluation of DES for post|coital
use. Working with its Obstetric and Gynelogical Advisory Committee, the
agency reviewed the available scientic evidence. In September 1973, the FDA
published a proposed rule in the Federal Register, establishing safety and ecacy
parameters for DES usage, and soliciting comments from interested parties.'96
One and half years later, in
'91Phase II Trials of Taxol, Ifosfamide for Recurrent Vaginal Clear Cell
Cancer in DES-Exposed Needed, Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep. (CCH), Blue Sheet,
Apr. 29, 1992 at 2|3.
'92Hutt, supra note 190, at 1653.
'94Letter from Peter Barton Hutt, Partner, Covington & Burling, to Philip
A. Corfman, M.D., Supervisory Medical Ocer for Fertility and Maternal Health
Drugs, FDA 5, (Nov. 6, 1992) (on le with Covington & Burling). Prescribing
an approved drug for an unapproved use is lawful according to the FDA'S in-
terpretation of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. Id.
'95See discussion of post|coital contraception, supra, pp. 38-40. '96Letter
from Peter Barton Butt, supra note 194, at 6.
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54February 1975, the agency issued a nal rule stating that the FDA would permit
marketing of DES as a post-coital contraceptive by any applicant who obtains an
approved abbreviated NDA.'97 Although no pharmaceutical company submitted
an NDA for the post-coital use of DES, the FDA'S rule-making process allowed
for comment by physicians and consumer groups,'98 and provided guidelines for
physicians who continued to prescribe the product.'99
The FDA's activist approach in the DES case remains the exception. Indeed,
in many instances, the FDA's strict requirements deter drug manufacturers from
marketing their products in the U.S. As Richard Lincoln of the AGI states, [t]he
situation we are getting into is funding research that is being done in other
countries for products that will be used in other countries that will never be
approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration.200 In other cases, the
FDA'S approval process simply serves to delay American access to products
long available in Europe. One example of this phenomenon is provided by
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. 's ORTHOCEPT (desogestrel/ethinyl estradiol),
which was rst marketed in the U.S. in January 1993, one month after the
'97Id. For a manufacturer to obtain NDA approval, the company had to
require written informed consent from patients before distribution of the drug.
Moreover, the product had to be packaged specially for postcoital use, and the
labeling had to explicitly list any and all risks. See, Butt, supra note 190,
at 1656. The use of DES was so controversial that even this narrow approval
provoked the Senate to propose legislation further limiting access to DES. Ul-
timately, Congress failed to pass any measure regulating DES for post|coital
use. Id.
1984Q Fed. Reg. 5351 (February 5, 1975).
'99Letter from Peter Barton Butt, supra note 194, at 6. 200Galen, supra note
69.
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55company obtained FDA clearance. In Europe, this product has been available
since 1981, and is currently the most widely-prescribed oral contraceptive 201
The FDA's testing requirements have proved an obstacle to other manufac-
turers as well. Lamberts, Ltd., the manufacturer of the cervical cap, had to
overcome several hurdles before its product could be oered in this country.
In 1976, Congress responded to the Dalkon Shield tragedy by increasing FDA
regulation of medical devices. Based on their long history of use in this country,
condoms and diaphragms were subject to grandfather clauses and did not have
to undergo agency evaluation. However, the FDA determined that the cervical
cap fell under the new regulations.202 The FDA'S determination ignored the
fact that the cap has been in use in some form since the 19th century, and that
it has been used worldwide in its modern incarnation for about sixty years. In-
deed, apparently unbeknownst to the FDA, the cap had been already available
in the U.S. through mail order.203
Initially, Lamberts, Ltd., a small English company, refused to comply with
the new testing requirements. For a company of its size, the investment nec-
essary to meet FDA standards was not economical. Consequently, despite its
past safety record, the cervical cap was prohibited from sale in the U.S. Finally,
in 1985, under pressure from women's
201Ortho Expands Its Oral Contraceptive Line: Introduces ORTHO-CEPT
and
Brings Europe's #1 Birth Control to the U.S. (Ortho Pharmaceutical
Corp., Raritan, N.J.), Jan. 18, 1993.
202Thomas, supra note 82, at 62.
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56groups, the FDA permitted Lamberts, Ltd. to perform abbreviated toxicity tests
and the NICHHD sponsored a study comparing the cap to the diaphragm.204
Three years later, in May 1988, the FDA oered approval of the cervical cap
with the following conditions: it may be prescribed only to women with normal
Pap tests, and cap users must return to their physician after the rst three
months for a Pap test. Moreover, the FDA demanded that the manufacturer
state the risk of toxic shock syndrome on the product label, and conduct post-
market studies on the link between the product and cervical cell changes that
may precipitate cervical cancer.205 Despite these conditions and the expense
of the approval process, the company was optimistic about its long| awaited
entry into the American market.206
The cervical cap example highlights the cost/benet analysis that pharma-
ceutical rms must perform before deciding whether to undertake the expense
of seeking approval for contraceptives in the U.S. Such an analysis is particu-
larly salient in light of patent issues. The Drug Price Competition and Patent
Restoration Act of 1984 oers only limited protection to drug manufacturers,207
and a company will be disinclined to invest large sums of money in clinical test-
ing if its product is likely to be copied as
205Cervical Cap Approved, BBS NEWS (Dep't of Health and Human Servs.,
Wash., D.C.), May 23, 1988.
206Steve Lohr, FDA Move Aids Tiny Company, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 1988,
at
33.
207Peter B. Butt, Landmark Pharmaceutical Law Enacted, 1 HEALTh ScAN
11
(1984).
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57soon as the patent expires by other rms who did not have to incur the same ini-
tial expense. Moreover, manufacturers must consider whether or not to proceed
with products likely to yield only a small return. In other words, the expense
of testing (as well as the potential cost of litigation) must be considered within
the framework of the modest prot margin oered by contraceptives like Nor-
plant, the TUD and postcoital contraceptives, all of which do not require repeat
purchases 208
Critics have attacked manufacturers of the long|lasting contraceptives Nor-
plant and Depo Provera when they attempted to defray their costs by charging
higher prices.209 The cost of Norplant in the U.S. is approximately $350, with
some private physicians charging an additional $500 or more for insertion. More-
over, Wyeth|Ayerst has not oered discounts to public agencies or charities as
other contraceptive manufacturers often do. Consequently, critics charge that
the company has limited use of the product to the very wealthy and the very
poor who are insured by Medicaid.210
Supporters of Wyeth-Ayerst assert that the rm may not be solely to blame
for its high prices. The price of Norplant may be an unintended result of legis-
lation which requires drug companies to oer rebates to Medicaid equaling
208Mastroianni, Jr. et al., supra note 4, at 484.
209Warren E. Leary, Long|Term Contraceptives' Cost Called Excessive,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1994, at 10.
210Medicaid Widening the Use of Implant for Birth Control, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 17, 1992, at Al. According to representatives from the AGI, public
programs will not invest in Norplant because clinics could use the same
$365 to buy four IUDs, or oral contraceptives for a year for 25 women.
Id.
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58the dierence between the average price and lowest price of the product. Such a
law provides an incentive to the drug companies to keep their prices high.21' In
addition, Wyeth| Ayerst claims that the price of Norplant in the U.S. reects
the cost of training physicians how to insert and remove the product. Although
the product is less expensive in other countries || in Finland it sells for about
$25 { the pharmaceutical company has not oered physician training in those
nations.212 Moreover, Wyeth-Ayerst has responded to criticisms by donating
$2.8 million to the Norplant Foundation, an organization formed to provide
free Norplant kits to women not covered by Medicaid or private insurance.213
Local governments have also tried to increase access to the product by creating
experimental programs to purchase Norplant and Depo Provera for distribution
to a broader
214
D. FUNDING
While contraception had been the subject of study for centuries, the distri-
bution of the Pill in 1960 enhanced popular interest in the eld, which in turn
inspired public grants for contraceptive research. The NICHHD began making
such grants in 1969. Two years later, the United States
211Sonia L. Nazario, Breakthrough in Birth Control May Elude Poor, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 4, 1991, at Bi.
213Medicaid Widening, supra note 210.
214Wyeth-Ayerst's Norplant Being Purchased for Government Distribution
to Non-Medicaid Poor, Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep. (CCH), Pink Sheet, Jan.
18, 1993, at 10. Such programs have been established in Maryland and
Virginia, and are being considered elsewhere. Id.
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59Agency for International Development (USAID) began channeling research and
development money through the Population Council in New York and Family
Health International in Research Triangle Park, North Carolina. However, the
interest in contraceptive research waned over the next decade. By 1988, funding
had dropped dramatically, and amounted to only about ten cents for each adult
and child in the U.S.215
Recent reports indicate that the National Institute of Health (NIH) spends
$10 million annually on contraceptive research. USAID spends approximately
$15 million, but mostly on simple inexpensive methods that would be practical in
developing nations.216 Aside from NIH and USAID, there are few other sources
of funding. WHO recently cut the budget of its human reproduction program,
and out of all of the large American foundations, only the Rockefeller and Mel-
lon Foundations are providing direct support for contraceptive development.217
According to Steven Sinding of the Rockefeller Foundation, his organization is
continuing to support contraceptive development because, [o]thers are pulling
out. We've articulated as our object to breathe new life into the eld.218
This lack of funding for research creates a self| perpetuating problem.
When the number of grants decrease,
215Thomas, supra note 82, at 49|50.
216Herman, supra note 2, at 14. These gures are particularly notable in
comparison to government allocations in other areas: $35 billion in military
research; $1.7 billion in AIDS and AIDS|related research; $120 million in breast
cancer research. 138 CONG. REC. B 2927 (daily ed. May 5, 1992).
217Berman, supra note 2, at 14.
218Id at 15.
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60fewer scientists seek doctorate degrees in reproductive biology because they are
unwilling to pursue an area of study where funding seems insecure.219 With
reproductive biology failing to attract skilled researchers, fewer developments
are made. Consequently, the eld becomes less appealing to investors and foun-
dations, and the cycle continues.
VI. Solutions to the Problems Limiting New Development
As in any crisis, it is easier to describe the problems leading to the slow
pace of development in contraception, than to provide solutions. Nevertheless,
although solutions to the problems hindering innovations in birth control, i.e
excessive product liability suits, negative political pressures, strict testing re-
quirements, and insucient research and funding, may be hard to come by,
certain measures may be taken to ameliorate the present situation.
A. Product Liability
One of the traditional suggestions for limiting product liability suits involves
placing caps on punitive damages. The theory behind this recommendation
holds that possible damage awards are so high that prospective plaintis, and
particularly their attorneys, view bringing suit as akin to a lottery { with such
a large potential payo, almost any product liability litigation is worth a shot.
Therefore,
2'9Thomas, supra note 82, at 68.
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61supporters of caps maintain that reducing the potential rewards of suit will
decrease litigiousness.220
Opponents of caps voice concern that the threat of enormous liability costs
are a necessary incentive to industry. They worry that if pharmaceutical com-
panies could pre|determine their liability costs, they might distort their risk
analysis to permit the distribution of unsafe products as long as the cost of
litigation is low enough to allow them to maintain a prot margin. Moreover,
opponents of damage caps assert that victims deserve compensation for their
injuries, and juries may be the best mechanism for determining the appropriate
amount of redress.22'
In any case, legislation establishing caps on damages appears unlikely to
be adopted by Congress any time soon. Over the past decade, tort reformers'
Fairness in Product Liability bill, has been proposed several times in Congress;
the bill has reached the Senate oor at least ve times with no success. Most
recently, the bill was defeated this past summer, after a libuster.222 The failure
of the latest version of this tort reform bill is especially notable, because its
sponsors mentioned several times during the debate that the measure did not
include any caps on damages.223 The absence of such provisions was intended
as a
220138 CoNG. REc. S4682 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992).
221Andy Pasztor & Stephen Wermiel, Plans for Product-Liability Bill
Generate Consensus Among Senate Panel Members, WALL ST. J., May 21,
1986, at 12.
222Product Liability Legislation Defeated As Senate Fails to Curtail
Filibuster, 1994 Daily Rep. For Executives (BNA), June 29, 1994, at 123.
223C0NG. REc., supra note 220.
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62selling point { limitations on punitive damages were so controversial that they
were eliminated as a concession to consumer groups and moderate members of
Congress.224
Despite these past defeats, proponents of tort reform, and damage caps in
particular, have lately expressed some optimism. The newly-elected Republican
Congress has included tort reform as part of its Contract with America. One
of the two tort reform bills presently being considered, new House Judiciary
Chairman Henry Hyde's (R-IL) Common Sense Legal Reforms Act includes a
provision capping punitive damages at $250,000 or three times the award for
economic damages, whichever is greater.225 Nevertheless, some experts assert
that the measure is unlikely to succeed, in part because tort reform is considered
to be a partisan issue, and the Democrats have retained enough seats in the
Senate to sustain a libuster.226
In addition to supporting caps on damages, some commentators have pro-
posed that a solution to the problem of excessive product liability suits lies in
the statutory establishment of a regulatory compliance defense. With such a
measure in place, pharmaceutical companies whose products obtain FDA ap-
proval would have some immunity from suit. In its February 1990 report, the
National Research Council's Committee on Contraceptive Development (NRC-
CCD) voiced its
224 Shift in Political Winds to Hit Product Safety and Liability, 1995
Daily Rep. For Executives (BNA), Jan. 19, 1995 at 12.
225Id
226Id
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63support for congressional legislation establishing a regulatory compliance de-
fense as well as uniform standards for product liability suits involving contraceptives.227
Such a proposal was also incorporated in the tort reform measure defeated this
past summer.228
The NRCCCD's proposed defense also included some notable exceptions.
For instance, the NRCCCD asserted that the regulatory compliance defense
would not be available if it were found that the manufacturer withheld relevant
information from the FDA in the approval process, or if information developed
by the company after approval had not been reviewed by the FDA for purposes
of determining whether the contraceptive, its marketing, or its labeling should be
changed.229 Relying on these exceptions, it seems as if the NRCCCD's proposal
would permit cases like Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. to go forward,
because the plainti could argue that the FDA did not know when it approved
spermicides for post-conception use that a member of its advisory committee had
previously consulted with Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.230 The NRCCCD's pro-
posal attempts to strike a balance between protecting companies from suit and
providing the proper incentives for companies to protect consumers from harm.
However, because some determination would be necessary to assess whether a
manufacturer properly
227Mastroianni, Jr. et. al., supra note 4, at 484.
228Product Liability Legis. Defeated, supra note 222.
229Mastroianni, Jr. et. al., supra note 4, at 484.
230Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 615 F. Supp. 262 (N.D. Ga.
1985), a'd., 788 F.2d 741 (11th Cir. 1986).
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64informed the FDA, this measure might not actually reduce the amount of litiga-
tion. Moreover, it is unclear whether the exceptions built into the NRCCCD's
proposal would serve to eviscerate the measure or would provide positive incen-
tives to the manufacturer and prevent industry manipulation of the
FDA.
Another means of dealing with the product liability issue is suggested by
the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986.231 The Act provides for a
federal no|fault compensation system which provides quick and certain reme-
dies for individuals injured by vaccines. Anyone injured by a vaccine must go
through the compensation program, and judgments and awards entered under
the program must be expressly rejected before other remedies can be pursued.
If an individual rejects the award granted through the no-fault program, she
may take action directly against the vaccine manufacturer by ling a civil suit.
However, stricter substantive and procedural requirements are established for
recovery of damages in civil court. Funding for the program is provided through
a tax on designated childhood vaccines.232
This no|fault program was designed to encourage manufacturers to enter
the vaccine market, thereby creating a larger pool of vaccines for preventing
disease and otherwise
231B.R. RZP. No. 908, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 1 (1986).
232 Id. at 3. In addition to establishing a new recovery system, the vaccine pro-
gram places additional burdens on manufacturers. They must keep records on
the production, testing, and handling of their products, and report any poten-
tial problems to an appropriate federal agency within 24 hours. The Secretary
of BBS has the authority to recall hazardous products, and to perform studies
on the products and the suciency of their labels. Id. at 4.
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65at 6.
234Id
improving public health. The circumstances leading to the passage of the
bill mirror those now surrounding the development of contraceptives. Vaccine
manufacturers were facing high tort liability costs from suits led by individ-
uals injured by their products. The pharmaceutical companies had responded
by raising their prices or by abandoning the vaccine market. Despite the oc-
casional grave injury, most experts (including public health ocials, physicians
and parent groups), believed that it was worthwhile to continue to prescribe the
products because of the larger benet for society as a whole.233
The no|fault scheme for vaccine liability benets both consumers and man-
ufacturers. Although consumers who accept the award through the no-fault
system give up the opportunity for a multi-million dollar settlement, for many,
it is a welcome trade. Under the no|fault system, the recovery process has
been streamlined, reducing transaction costs and increasing certainty of recov-
ery. Manufacturers prot from the system as well, because much of the expense
of litigation, including investments of both time and money, has been elimi-
nated. In addition, by funding the compensation through a tax, rather than
manufacturers, the program allows companies to reduce the costs of their lia-
bility insurance and remain in business.234 Enabling the companies to remain
solvent, the no-fault program ultimately protects all
65
66235Id at 7.
2365ee note 128, supra.
consumers by eliminating the health hazards that would occur if vaccines
were not available.235
Such a no|fault system may be one solution to the product liability problem
facing contraceptive developers. Not only are the market conditions similar, but
the consequences of the absence of birth control choices, including unplanned
pregnancy and its attendant social ills, are arguably no less hazardous to society
than a shortage of vaccines. Nevertheless, the applicability of such a program to
contraceptive development remains questionable because birth control is more
politically divisive than vaccination.
Finally, another means of minimizing the impact of product liability suits
may be through the establishment of single drug companies. Such rms could
either be for-prot entities subsidized by government tax breaks, structurally
similar to those companies presently producing orphan drugs, or non|prot
organizations. Etienne|Emile Baulieu, the developer of RU-4 86, has suggested
that creation of such single|drug companies would facilitate the distribution
of controversial drugs like RU|486 because the companies would be insulated
from the threat of boycott.236 A potential problem with such a structure would
be the diculty of attracting investors to a business that could grow only in a
linear manner. After all, any product diversication would
66
67diminish the organization's protection from suit or negative market forces.
B. Politics
Instead of allowing the political debate about contraceptives to focus on
the morally and politically divisive issue of abortion, pharmaceutical companies
should characterize contraception as a women's health issue. Thus, the compa-
nies must emphasize the link between birth control and the prevention of AIDS
and other STDs. In addition, they must capitalize on the momentum of the
recent movement to address women's health concerns, most notably in the area
of breast cancer.
One means of overcoming some of the pharmaceutical companies' reticence
in developing new contraception is to remind manufacturers of the pressing
need to develop products that help prevent the transmission of the virus that
causes AIDS. When contraception is viewed as a life-saving necessity, rather
than simply as a means of preventing pregnancy, it may gain more political
acceptance and broader| based public support. The link between contraception
and disease prevention is becoming more well|known and has fueled interest
in developing more contraceptives like the male condom, which simultaneously
prevent conception and disease. Indeed, at least one commentator has suggested
that a physician who prescribes a non-barrier method and fails to
67
68warn about possible infection may be guilty of malpractice for the omission.237
Because references to AIDS also provoke some negative political and moral
reactions, particularly by those who link the spread of the disease to promiscuity,
pharmaceutical companies may be more inclined to characterize contraception
as a women's health issue and align themselves with the growing movement to
combat breast cancer. Public awareness of breast cancer has increased dramat-
ically over the past few years.238 Moreover, the issue has garnered increased
funding and political support. Indeed, for the past few years, Congress has or-
dained October as Breast Cancer Awareness month.239 A movement to increase
contraceptive options has the potential of arousing similar positive publicity.
Just as the risk of breast cancer cuts across all socio|economic lines, all women
need new birth control alternatives.
Yet ironically, the fact that all segments of society would benet from con-
traceptive development may also diminish the likelihood of inspiring a political
movement to enhance birth control options. When benets from political action
are diuse, a free|rider problem appears and people are less motivated to take
action. Moreover, women's organizations, who would seem to be the most likely
voice for political change, are not united in their views on contraception.
237Thomas, supra note 82, at 67.
238140 CoNG. REC. B 10428 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1994).
239Id
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69C. Testing
The NRCCCD has recommended simplifying FDA regulations for the tox-
icological and clinical testing of contraceptives, so that the FDA'S standards
will conform with the guidelines of WHO and other industrialized nations. To
this end, the NRCCCD suggested an international conference on the regulation
of contraceptive development.240 Such a conference would be an important rst
step towards regulatory reform. Moreover, by meeting with health organiza-
tions worldwide, American fertility scientists may be able to obtain international
sponsorship for their research.
The NRCCCD also noted that the FDA's current stringent policies reect the
agency's presumption that contraceptives must meet a higher standard because
they are used primarily by healthy people. According to the NRCCCD, the
FDA's position neglects the fact that currently available methods do not meet
the needs of many people and that the risks of pregnancy, labor and delivery for
these individuals are often greater than the risks associated with the methods
of birth control.24' Consequently, the committee recommended that FDA revise
its procedures to recognize the special safety advantages of new methods for
identiable groups not adequately served by already approved contraceptive
methods.242 Moreover, the committee suggested that the FDA approve a drug
even if that drug or device presents a risk to
240Mastroianni, Jr. et al., supra note 4, at 483.
2411d at 484.
242Id
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70some populations, if it can be shown that the new contraceptive also oers
a safety advantage for other users when compared with that group's actual
contraceptive practice, including the failure to use any method at all. Labeling
for these new products could include a listing of possible adverse eects, and use
of the product could be restricted by physicians to a well|dened population.
Finally, approval of these riskier products could be accompanied by strict post-
marketing surveillance by the FDA, and long-term epidemiological studies.243
Just as the political problems facing contraceptive development may be re-
duced by aligning birth control with controlling STDs and AIDS, some testing
obstacles may also be overcome if contraception is seen as necessary tool of
disease prevention. Already, streamlined testing procedures have been imple-
mented in response to the AIDS crisis. Concern that women needed a way to
protect themselves from infection prompted the FDA in August 1989 to propose
guidelines for an abbreviated review process for female barrier contraceptives
that prevent STDs. This approach has allowed for the marketing of these prod-
ucts after the second phase of clinical trials. The products must be advertised
as eective against STDs, and include a disclaimer noting that their ecacy
against contraception has not yet been proved. Meanwhile post|marketing
studies on their ecacy as
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71contraception must continue.244 Using this accelerated approval process, the
FDA's Obstetrics and Gynecology Panel recommended conditional approval of
the female condom in December 1992, based on ecacy data derived from a
pregnancy study.245
The FDA's proposal for interim marketing was praised by members of the
pharmaceutical industry and even gained the tentative support of the National
Women's Health Network.246 The AGI also oered its support of the FDA's
proposal for quick approval, as long as the Phase II trials included both a large
enough sample and extensive post-marketing studies. Indeed, Jeannie Roso,
president of AGI, suggested that the FDA expand upon its idea of an abbrevi-
ated process, stating, [i]f a streamlined process is both possible and desirable
for a particular purpose (STD prevention) as it evidently is, why is it not also
possible and desirable for the development of female contraceptive methods for
the prevention of unintended pregnancy?247 Among its other suggestions, AGI
recommended including some less healthy participants in the study, e.g., indi-
viduals suering from hypertension, to
244Barrier Contraceptives Should Bypass Phase III Clinical Study, MDDI
REP., Sept. 4, 1989, at 12. Phase I studies would track 10 to 20 females; Phase
II would involve at least 200 subjects; and the post-market Phase III would
compare the use of the device over a 12 month period by a minimum of 1100
women to the same number of women using a currently marketed product. Id.
at 13.
245Mireya Navarro, Female Condom is Winning Favor, N. Y. TIMES, Dec.
15, 1993, at Bi.
246Id
247Letter from Jeannie Roso, Pres., AGI, to Dockets Mgmt. Branch, FDA
(July 31, 1990) (on le with the Regulatory Watchdog Serv.).
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72determine the applicability of contraceptive methods to such sub|populations
248
Several other suggestions have been oered for reducing the extensive delays
in the FDA approval process. One commentator recommended that the U.S.
contract out the performance of product reviews to private organizations.249
While such a program may increase eciency, it is not clear how to prevent
an outside contractor, particularly one subject to tort liability, from proceeding
slowly in order to avoid approval of a thalidomide. A private review program
would necessitate strict safeguards to prevent manipulation by industry to the
detriment of consumers. Generally, the FDA would still have to play a signicant
oversight role to ensure that private contractors nd the proper balance between
eciency and thoroughness.
Even if the FDA were reluctant to cede responsibility for approval to the
private sector, the agency might at least adopt a policy to recognize clinical
studies performed in foreign countries. Such a measure would limit duplicate
testing on animals and humans, thereby expediting the review process, and
reducing the need for additional trial participants.250 Of course, before adopting
a policy which permitted reliance on foreign studies, the FDA would need to
establish guidelines for assessing their quality.
2481d AGI also asked for increased information on the outcome of the cases
where contraceptive failure occurred, i.e., whether there was a birth or an abor-
tion, and for complete pre|trial counseling for the subjects. Id.
249Chicoine, supra note 118, at 90 n.68.
2501d at 90 n.69.
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73In addition, the FDA might follow the example set by Great Britain's CSM
and shift agency focus from premarket screening to post-market testing. In
order to facilitate this process, the FDA could establish a user registry sys-
tem for newly|approved products.25' Patients could use a toll-free number
to alert the agency of complaints, and the agency would be able to track the
population of users to determine the need for product warnings or recalls.252
Similarly, the FDA could adopt a pro|active approach toward regulation and
propose guidelines for the proper use of contraceptives as it did in the 1970s
when it evaluated DES for post|coital use.253 Because such a policy seems to
be extremely resource| intensive, the agency would be wise to limit its eorts
to circumstances where manufacturers have little incentive to pursue approval,
such as assessments of unapproved uses of already|approved products.
Another possible means of encouraging research would involve an examina-
tion of the role that patent regulation has had on contraceptive development.
Such an inquiry may reveal that pharmaceutical rms would do more contracep-
tive research if they could protect the fruits of their labors for a longer period
of time. On the other hand, changing patent law to extend the protection pe-
riod may act to the detriment of consumers by further limiting choice and/or
inating
251Galen, supra note 69.
252 Oral Contraceptive Patient Label: One Page Summary Recommended,
Food
Drug and Cosm. L. Rep. (CCH), Pink Sheet, Nov. 1, 1993, at 1.
253Hutt, supra note 190, at 1653.
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74prices. Moreover, such a change may not be needed if tort reform proposals,
making the expense of research more justiable to industry, were enacted.
D. Funding
To increase competition in the eld of long|acting contraceptives, Repre-
sentative Wyden (D|OR) of the House Small Business/Regulation Subcom-
mittee, proposed that, the government fund an accelerated R & D eort to
create more products.254 Representatives from the pharmaceutical trade group,
National Family Planning and Reproductive Health Association agreed with
Wyden and also proposed dierent ways to build a mutually benecial eco-
nomic relationship between manufacturers and government. For example, the
trade group suggested that the government oer grants to small pharmaceuti-
cals manufacturers to develop contraceptives under contracts stipulating that
the manufacturers must sell the product to the government at a lower pub-
lic price when it comes to market. The government would then distribute the
products to federal and non|prot clinics. Other suggestions for saving gov-
ernment money included: requiring manufacturers to oer a lower public price
for the results of research funded with public money, and bulk purchasing of
new products by the government.255
254 Upjohn Discussing Depo Provera Discount for Family Planning Group;
Surgeon General Elders Tries Gentle Persuasion on Long|Acting
Contraceptive Prices, Food Drug and Cosm. L. Rep. (CCB), Pink Sheet,
Mar. 21, 1994, at 4.
255Id
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75Congress has also suggested other means of enhancing funding for contraceptive
research. Congress rst proposed The Contraceptive and Infertility Research
Centers Act on April 25, 1991, as part of an omnibus package of legislation
referred to as the Women's Health Equity Act. The purpose of the bill was to
conduct clinical and applied research; train physicians, scientists and other al-
lied health professionals; develop model continuing education programs for such
professionals; and disseminate information to them.256 The bill also attempted
to attract more researchers to this eld by establishing a loan repayment pro-
gram for scientists involved in contraceptive or infertility research. In addition,
the bill would facilitate research by authorizing payment for the subjects of such
studies. The act allocated $15 million a year for 1992|1994; $20 million for
1995, and whatever would be necessary for 1996.257 Despite the fact that its
sponsors were on both sides of the abortion debate, and attempted to defuse any
controversy surrounding the measure,258 the bill failed to pass in 1991. How-
ever, $3 million was provided for the development of these centers through the
NIH budget. The measure failed to pass again when it was re|introduced in
1993.259
256139 CONG. Rzc. S527 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1993).
2581d. As Senate sponsor Sen. Barkin (D-IL) stated, [wjhatever positions
we take on the question of abortion, if we are committed to helping couples have
children who want them, and to reducing the incidence of abortion in the case
of those who do not, this bill is a step in the right direction. Id.
259Id
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76The failure of the government to promote eectively contraceptive research,
highlights the need for action from the private sector. More specically, large
private foundations, like the Ford and Carnegie Foundations, which are often
willing to support programs that deal with the societal results of unplanned
pregnancy, must step in to address the causes of these social ills. In addition,
organizations like Planned Parenthood should take a more active role in funding
new contraceptive alternatives.
The NRCCCD has also recommended more funding by the government and
by non-prot foundations, noting that the government and other investors have
to ensure long-term stability for research projects. The NRCCCD blamed the
absence of progress in this area on the uctuation in funding over the past
decades, noting that this situation frightens o serious clinical investigators
concerned with job security.260 Clearly, increasing funding will attract more
scientists to this eld. Thus, by pledging nancial support, the government and
foundations can end the negative cycle stymieing contraceptive development.
VII. CONCLUSION
The number of unplanned pregnancies in this country and the limited con-
traceptive options demonstrate a clear need for new birth control alternatives
in the United States. Nevertheless, pharmaceutical companies generally believe
that
260Mastroianni Jr. et al., supra note 4, at 483.
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77investing in contraception research and testing makes little nancial sense. As
Roderick L. Mackenzie notes, industry nds focusing on drugs intended for other
uses, like ulcers, immuno|therapy and cardiovascular disease more worthwhile.
Mackenzie has observed that, [un those elds you don't have to be 100 percent
eective, you can be 70 percent eective. Your side eects don't have to be
zero, they can be 20 percent and still not be unacceptable. You don't have a
sea of bad publicity endangering your other drugs, and your researchers can get
Nobel Prizes.26'
The problems hindering contraceptive development are large, but hardly
seem insurmountable. In order to encourage development in this eld, phar-
maceutical companies, government and non|prot public health and women's
rights organizations must make a commitment to address these obstacles and
foster a positive climate for change.
261Hilts, supra note 13, at 70.
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